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INTRODUCTION 
Modem diplomacy has, over the years, come to signify 
the development of external relations between the world's 
major powers. When one looks back upon the diplomatic 
history of the twentieth century, he is struck by such key 
phrases as "the Big Pour" or "the Big Five." However, 
the art of diplomacy is not confined to the larger powers 
alone. The smaller states, particularly In wartime, have 
often assumed a role completely out of proportion to their 
relative size. Witness, in this regard, the role played 
by such normally insignificant powers as Serbia in 1914, 
Poland in 1939, Korea in 1950, or Viet Nam in 196?„ 
A small state need not, however, become a battle­
ground to assume an important role in the diplomacy of 
nations. If it contains within its borders economic, pol­
itical or military assets, a smaller power may well find 
Itself in the limelight of diplomatic affairs. Such was 
the case with Ireland in the Second World War when, because 
of its strategical importance, it found itself the unwilling 
recipient of Nazi Germany's attentions. 
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Germany's Interest in Ireland stemmed, not from any 
Intrinsic value of that country, but rather, from Ire­
land's geographical proximity to Britain. Therefore, 
German military and political authorities never viewed 
neutral Eire as an end unto itself but simply as a means 
of striking at Great Britain. In short, Ireland became 
an unlocked door through which the ïhlrd Belch might 
enter Britain. 
The German exploitation of Eire's neutrality took 
two broad or basic forms, political and military. Neither 
method, however, can be truly separated, for each served 
to complement the other. Politically, through the German 
Legation in Dublin, and the various agencies of the pro­
paganda and Intelligence departments, Nazi Germany sought 
to strengthen the will of the Irish government to remain 
indiscriminately neutral. In doing so, Nazi diplomacy 
directly aided the German military staffs which sought to 
use Eire to advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic and as 
a possible base of attack against Britain. 
There are four examples which can be studied to ascer­
tain the extent to which the diplomatic and military estab­
lishments of Germany used Eire, and more specifically* Irish 
neutrality0 to accomplish their objectives. The first of 
these deals with the efforts made by German diplomacy to 
maintain Eire's neutralityto Influence the views of Eire 
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toward pro-British Northern Ireland, and finally, but 
by no means least importantly, to strengthen the minority 
pro-German sentiment which existed In Eire during the 
Second World War. 
The second case deals with the German diplomatic 
efforts to maintain the neutrality of Irish sea ports, 
which assumed a position of high Importance during the 
Battle of the Atlantic. Viewed also in this regard Is the 
effect which the neutrality of those ports had upon the 
German naval campaign àgainst British shipping. 
Third, one must study the operations of the German 
Intelligence service in Eire. The intelligence depart­
ment (or Abwehr) sought throughout the war to build an 
Intelligence network in Ireland, to use Eire as a base 
for esiponage activities in Northern Ireland and Britain, 
and to bring direction to the efforts of the violently 
anti-British, ,ultra-nationalist Irish Republican Army. 
In so doing, the Abwehr delved into both the political 
and military spheres of influence in Ireland. 
The final case deals with the proposed German invasion 
of Ireland. Although primarily a military problem, the 
invasion plan nonetheless had political ramifications as 
well. 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the four 
cases in point, it is necessary to submit two factors 
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which had a Waring on German relations with Eire. The 
first is the simple issue of precedent. None of the 
four studies was initiated by Nazi Germany, Each had 
been attempted either by a Germany of an earlier era, 
or by an entirely different country. Host importantly„ 
the Third Reich was forced to take into account the 
delicate question of Irish sensibilities and Irish opinion. 
CHAPTER I 
GEEMANY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF IRISH NEUTRALITY 
German diplomats who arrived In Dublin during the 
period immediately preceding World War II discovered a 
new country^ Eire, with a political position founded upon 
neutrality. After several centuries of British rule, Ire­
land, or at least the southern twenty-sli counties, had 
become a Free State In 1921o By 1937, many of the final 
ties between Ireland and Britain had been removed: the 
king was no longer recognized as ruler In Southern Ireland; 
all colonial offices had been abolished; a measure of econ-
omic independence had been attained, and finally, to make 
clear that the country was indeed Independent, the Gaelic 
term Eire had replaced its English equivalent, Ireland.^ 
While German diplomats could, therefore, quite readily 
understand the nature of the new state, they no doubt had 
much more difficulty in discerning the nature of Irish neu^ 
trallty. Generally, one can arrive at two reasons why the 
Irish government, in the pre-war period, came to the de­
cision to remain neutral in the event of a world conflict. 
^ All of the above are found in the 1937 Irish Constit­
ution, 
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The first stems from simple political reality in a world 
dominated by a few major powers„ The Prime Minister of 
Eire, Eamon de Valera,^ had also served, during the 1930's, 
as President of the League of Nations. At League president^ 
de Valera had been most strongly affected by the Abyssinian 
crisis and the inability of the League to restrain a large 
state. Speaking on July 2, 1936, de Valera exemplified the 
frustration felt by the head of a small nation in a world 
rapidly evolving into two great military camps s 
is there any small nation represented here which 
does not feel the truth of the warning that what 
l8 Ethiopia's fate to-day may well be Its own fate 
to-morrow, should greed or the ambition of some 
powerful neighbors prompt its destruction. . . . 
peace is dependent upon the will of the great 
States. All the small States can do. If the 
statesmen of the greater States fail in their duty, 
l8 resolutely to determine that they will resist 
with whatever strength they possess every attempt 
to force them into a war against their will.3 
Obviously, as a smaller nation, Eire would remain neutral 
In a world conflict. = 
In addition to political reality, there was also some-
thing akin to a moral issue Involved in Dublin"s decision to 
maintain neutrality. During the many years of struggle to 
regain their independence, the Irish had created a large 
degree of pride in their nation and its accomplishments. 
Eamon de Valera, 1882~present<, De Valera served as 
head of state of the Free State from 1932-1938, Prom 1938-
1948 and 1951-195^ he was Prime Minister of Eire. He is now 
President of the Republic of Ireland. 
3 Eamon de Valera, Peace and War; Speeches by Mr. de 
Valera on International Affairs, (Dublin, 1944), 54— 59. 
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That pride could not, in 1939o allow them to join their 
old overlord Britain in a war aginst Nazi Germany, Al­
though Germany had earlier provided aid to the Irish in 
their seach for independence,^ and theoretically could 
also aid Eire to reclaim the northern six counties still 
under British control, Dublin could not Join the side of 
the Axis powers either. To join either side in the conflict 
would have meant an abandonment of Eire's freedom of inde­
pendent actions. As a result, as the war progressed, neut­
rality became increasingly associated with independence, 
German diplomats thus were faced with two tasks in 
the coming war—to urge the Irish to maintain their neut-
rallty, and to exploit that neutrality to the benefit of 
their fatherland. 
Wartime relations between Germany and Eire were guided, 
in all fields of Interest, by three major considerations, 
the most important of which was the conduct of Anglo-Irish 
affairs, Ireland, the "backdoor to England," proved to be 
a constant problem to the policy makers at Whitehall. As 
a result, Anglo-Irish affairs served as an excellent baro­
meter of German-Irish affairs? for when relations between 
Britain and Eire were at their worst, as was the case bet­
ween 1939 and 1944, German-Irish relations were generally 
4 For details of German aid to the Irish in their search 
for independence, see Chapter III. 
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at their best. 
The opinion of Irish-Americans was yet another 
factor which served to influence the German attitude 
toward Eire. In conducting their relations with Eire, 
both Germany and Great Britain considered the reaction 
among the Irish living in the United States. While this 
was, of course, more important before the entry of the 
United States into the war, it nevertheless continued to be 
an area of consideration throughout the conflict. 
Of a more direct effect upon the relations between the 
two countries was the existence of pro-British Northern Ire-
land. Prime Minister de Valera had, when he declared that 
Eire would remain neutral in the event of war, based his 
decision in part on the fact that Britain was helping to 
maintain the existence of an independent Ulster» Cooper-
atlon between Britain and Eire, he stated, would be "very, 
very slight" as long as partition of the island remained. 
Furthermore» if, when war started, British troops remained 
stationed in Northern Ireland, Irish sentiment undoubtedly 
would become more hostile toward Great Britain.^ While 
Britain chose to support its sometimes bellicose ally in 
Northern Ireland, Germany could only gain by giving support 
5 Survey of International Affairs, 19^9-1946, Vol. Ill, 
"The War and the Neutrals,"^"{London, 1956) <, 235." Hereafter 
cited as Survey. 
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to Dublin» As a result, the German foreign office and 
propaganda ministry became increasingly vocal in support 
of Irish demands seeking an end to partition. 
On April 26, 1939, relations between Great Britain and 
Eire reached a new low. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain^ 
announced on that day the establishment of the Military 
Training Bill by which military conscription was to be 
initiated in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, De Valera, 
who firmly believed that the northern six counties were an 
integral part of the Irish Republic, viewed the bill as an 
act of aggression against Eire. On May 2, he denounced the 
bill before the Dail Eireann (parliament) protesting "in 
the strongest terms the imposition of conscription in that 
part of our country."? The Irish Prime Minister was joined 
in his opposition to the bill by all members of the Dail, 
as well as the nationalists and Catholics in Northern Ire­
land, and the Irish in the United States,® 
On May 4, Chamberlain, perhaps fearing that hostil­
ities would once more begin between Irish nationalists 
^ Neville Chamberlain, 1869-1940. From October, 1931 
to May, 1937, Chamberlain served as the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and from May, 1937 until 19^0 he was prime min­
ister. 
? Survey, VII, 236. 
8 Round Table, No. 115, "Ireland's Vital Problems," 
June, 1939, 590-591. 
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and loyalists 5 announced that Ireland would not be Included 
In the Military Training Bill. While feelings were some­
what placated in Eire, loyalists north of the border viewed 
the decision as being yet another surrender to Eamon de 
Valera.^ 
The German foreign ministry, while it was kept in­
formed on the progress of events, remained silent during 
the incident. However, Foreign Minister Joachim von 
Ribbentrop^® later instructed the German Minister in Eire, 
Eduard Eempel,^^ to inform the Irish Prime Minister (with­
out specifically mentioning possible German aid to end 
partition) that "wide sympathy was felt in Germany for 
Ireland and the national aspirations of the Irish people. 
Undoubtedly the Reich government thought the time Inappro­
priate for alienating the British government by more 
^ The Times (London), April 29, 1939 afid May 
1939. 
10 Joachim von Ribbentrop^ 1883-19^6. In 1931, Ribben­
trop became Hitler's personal advisor on foreign affairs, 
and from 1936-1938 he served as ambassador to England. 
Ribbentrop held the position of Foreign Minister of Germany 
from 1938-1943, and was hanged as a war criminal at Nurem­
berg in October, 1946. 
Eduard Eempel, German Minister to Eire, 1937-19^5-
U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy. 1918-1945. Series D, VII, Doc. No. 428, 422. Here-
after cited as D.G.F.P. 
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strongly supporting Irish demands. 
For the remainder of the summer» diplomatic activity 
between Germany and Eire remained somewhat subdued. 
However, in the week immediately preceding the outbreak 
of war activity between Berlin and Dublin greatly In­
creased. On August 24, Hempel Informed Ribbentrop that 
Joseph P. Walshe 9.^3 the Secretary General of the Irish 
Foreign Ministry, had contacted him on the previous day. 
At that time Walshe once more assured the German minister 
that Eire would definitely remain neutral If war were 
declared between the major powers. Only a definite attack, 
Walshe stated, would provoke Eire to change Its non-
1 it 
belligerent position. 
Three days later, Ribbentrop Instructed Hempel that. 
In view of the deterioration of the political situation. 
It was necessary to make a formal declaration of policy 
toward Ireland. The declaration, as presented to de 
Valera, contained the usual assurances of good will and, 
In addition, a rather vague threat: 
Joseph Patrick Walshe, wartime Secretary General 
of tt# Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eire. De Valera, In 
addition to being Prime Minister, also served as Foreign 
Minister. 
14 D.G.F.P., VII, Doc. No. 303, 311. 
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In accordance with the friendly relations 
between ourselves and Ireland we are determined 
to refrain from any hostile action against Irish 
territory and to respect her integrity, pro­
vided that Ireland « for her part, maintains un­
impeachable neutrality towards us in any conflict. 
Only if this condition should no longer be ob­
tained as a result of a decision of the Irish 
Government themselves, or by pressure exerted 
on Ireland from other quarters, should we be 
compelled as a matter of course . . . to safe­
guard our interests in the sphere of warfare in 
such a way as the situation then arising might 
demand of us. 
Hempel also informed de Valera that all Irish citizens 
then living in Germany would be allowed to remain there, 
even if war should come, and that Germany would make 
every effort to avoid disrupting Irish trade in the pro­
gress of the submarine war, 
De Valera, upon receiving the German declaration, 
reiterated that the Irish government Intended to remain 
unimpeachably neutral. However, the neutrality of Eire, 
and the maintenance of good relations between the two 
countries, would be dependent upon a number of conditions. 
Ireland's close proximity to Britain, and its dependence 
upon trade with that country « forced the Irish government 
to "show certain consideration for Britain, which in 
similar circumstances they would also show Germany. 
De Valera further requested that Germany refrain from 
D.G.F.P.. VII, Doc. No. ^4.28, ^4.22. 
Ibid. 
17 Ibid. Doc. No. 484, 4?!. 
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violating Irish territorial waters, exploiting the anti-
British Irish Republican Army, and taking hostile action 
against the Irish of pro-British sentiment in Ulster. 
In the years of war which followed, Eire remained well 
within the legal limits of its neutrality. However, 
Germany continually saw fit to overlook the conditions 
which had been established before the war. 
During the first month of the war, as the Wehrmacht 
overran Poland and the Allies manned defensive positions 
in France, Eire remained untouched by continental events. 
Except in the sphere of naval matters, Ireland was of 
little or no interest to the major powers who busily 
19 
watched the progress of the war in the east» - The majority 
of the Irish themselves strongly supported de Valera in 
his determination to keep the country neutral, with the 
result that a strengthened national self-consciousness 
quickly arose. ; 
Although Ireland was thus fulfilling its self-
appointed commitment to neutrality, the German foreign 
ministry nonetheless recognized that any combination of 
18 D.G.F.P.. VII. Doc. No. 484, 4?!. 
^9 One curious exception to the lack of Interest in 
Ireland was reported by the London Times on September 3 : 
"The British in Peking . . . this morning woke to kind banners 
hung across the streets, declaring in English? 'Let Ireland 
be represented in China' and 'Ireland is no longer the slave 
of Britain.' A few early risers saw Chinese police of the 
Japanese-sponsored Chinese.Government;hanging up the 
banners „ . „ its object is puzzling." 
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the many external and Internal Influences affecting Eire 
could bring about a change In policy. The question of 
German-Irish relations was therefore once again brought 
up in October. 
On October 8, Eempel reported that Irlsh^opinlon, 
"especially In view of the sympathy for Catholic Poland 
which has had a fate similar to Ireland's," was at that 
20 
time largely anti-German. However, the German radio had 
nevertheless succeeded in prompting pro-German sympathies 
in the rural areas of the Island. As a result, Hempel 
suggested that Germany continue to support "consolidation 
of Irish neutrality and independence on a broad national 
basis, which Is also Important in its effect on the Domin­
ions, India, and America, as symptom of the loosening of 
the ties of Empire.*^1 
During the remainder of 1939, German-Irish relations 
continued to be relatively good. Indeed, relations were 
somewhat Improved In November, when the United States 
announced that Eire would thenceforth be considered 
within the combat zone in which American shipping could 
not operate. The Irish government, perhaps believing 
the announcement to be the result of indirect British 
pressure to abandon neutrality, sent an immediate complaint 
20 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 216, 241. 
21 Ibid. 
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to the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. The 
entire episode resulted in the increased determination 
of Eire to remain neutral and, hence, outside the Allied 
block. 
In the period preceding the German invasion of the 
West, Ireland completed the motions of assuming a warlike 
footing. The Irish army» which had numbered 15,000 at 
the beginning of the war, was eventually increased to 
150,000 with the addition of reservists and volunteers, 
A rigid censorship was initiated, as was a rather half­
hearted attempt to bring the blackout to Eire's major 
Oh 
cities. The principal question in Ireland nonetheless 
remained, as it had before, the continuance of partition. 
Although Germany and Great Britain sought to Influence the 
final settlement of the question, the main conflict re­
mained an Irish one, between Dublin and Belfast. De Valera, 
seeking to end partition and remain neutral in the same 
instant, was opposed by Lord Cralgavon,^^ the Anglophile 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Craigavon viewed 
22 Cordell Hull, 1871-1939= Hull served as senator from 
Tennessee from 1931-1933, and as secretary of state, 1933-1944. 
23 The Times (London), November 15» 1939. 
Ibid, November 7, 1939. 
25 Lord Craigavon, James Craig, 1871-1940. Leader of the 
Ulster Unionists who sought union with Britain, and the first 
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1921-1940. 
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de Valera's effort as yet another attempt at "black­
mailing the British Government to end partition, and 
this at the very moment when the enemy is at our gates. 
Ireland became Increasingly Important after Germany's 
successful invasion of the Low Countries and France<. 
Popular opinion in Britain, which had previously regarded 
Irish neutrality as a necessary (if somewhat bothersome) 
evil, became more Intensely outspoken In its demands 
that Eire discard its neutral position. Solutions to the 
problam of closing "England's back door" ranged the entire 
gamut of credibility„ Some elements in Britain, quite 
few in number, suggested that the United Kingdom might 
sacrifice Northern Ireland to Eire in an effort to buy 
Irish participation In the war. At the ppposlte end of 
the pole came the near-hysterloal plan to send the Can-
adian Air Force Into Eire and the Polish and Gzeck Legions 
together with Charles de Gaulle's French Legion, to the 
border between Northern and Southern Ireland^ ' By far 
the most serious possibility, insofar as Germany and 
Eire were concerned, was the threat of a British invasion 
of Ireland, 
The situation reached crisis proportions when 
Winston Churchill, an opponent of previous concessions 
26 The Times (London), July 1, 1940. 
27 Time, XXXVI, July 15, 1940, 2]. 
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to Ireland, Issued a strong statement denouncing the 
Irish stand on neutrality and hinted at possible action 
2 A 
to alleviate the situation. De Valera Immediately 
announced that Eire was prepared to defend itself against 
any aggressor, including Great Britain. 
The German foreign ministry seized the situation as 
an excellent opportunity to further strengthen German-
Irish relations, and therefore indirectly strike at 
Great Britain. Accordingly « Ernst von Weizsaeker,̂  ̂the 
German State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, instructed 
Minister Hempel on November 13 to inform de Valera that 
Germany expected Eire to resist any British interference 
in Irish neutrality. By doing so, Eire would join in a 
common front with Germany and, hence, would "realise her 
national goals" when Britain was crushed. 
While Ribbentrop's foreign ministry thus urged on 
Dublin through diplomatic channels, German military author­
ities initiated investigation into the possibility of 
furnishing military assistance to Ireland in the event 
of a British attack. On November 14, General Walter 
28 Time. XXXVI, November 18, 1940, 26-2?. 
^9 Ernst Von Weizaeker, 1882-1951 » State Secretary 
of the German Foreign Ministry,'1938-1943. 
30 D.G.F.P.. XI. Doo. No. 333, 570. 
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Warllmont,^^ Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the 
German High Command, Oberkommando der Wehrmaoht (OKW), 
informed Special Ambassador Karl Rltter^^ that, because 
Britain controlled the sea and air between the continent 
and Ireland, little could actually be done to prevent 
British military moves. However, Warllmont believed that 
German submarines could be deployed around the Irish ports, 
which Great Britain would most certain seize, and that 
Luftwaffe attacks could be extended to areas in Ireland 
occupied by the British. Until badly needed supplies were 
received, it would be Impossible to provide further aid, 
such as the landing of airborne troops. The war diary of 
the Wehrmaoht Operations Staff nonetheless noted that, 
"Ambassador Hitter believes that In this case the Fuehrer 
will demand the utmost of the Wehrmaoht."33 , 
Ten days following the conference between Eltter and 
Warllmont, Ribbentrop forwarded to Hempel a top-secret, 
coded message instructing the German minister to contact 
de Valera, personally if possible, to discover the extent 
to which German aid might be welcomed, Hempel had earlier 
Informed the foreign ministry that many sources in Eire, 
including the Minister of Justice, Arthur Boland, believed 
31 Walter Warllmont, Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff 
I939-I944. Transferred to OKH Command Pool In 1944. 
32 Karl Hitter, Ambassador on Special Assignment» 
33 D.G.F.P.. XI, Doo. No. 333. 570. 
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that an Irish request for German aid was actually under 
consideration. Rlbbentrop stated that if such were the 
case, and if a British attack oame« the Irish government 
"could very well imagine that the Rieoh Government would be 
in a position to give Ireland vigorous support and would be 
inclined to do so."^^ If Dublin proved agreeable, Hempel was 
to find by which ship, and into which ports, German military 
supplies might be sent. 
On November 28, General Alfred Jodl,^^ Chief of Oper­
ations of the OKM, reported to Hitter that both Hitler and 
Rlbbentrop believed that, if Eire defended itself to the ut­
most, the expected British invasion would cause "tremendous 
repercussions" in many of the world's capitals. In the event 
of suoh an invasion taking place, the OKW was considering the 
shipment of captured British weapons to Eire. Such weapons, 
Jodl stated, could be easily transferred to Eire aboard 
Irish ships from the German ports In France. 
The following day Rlbbentrop Instructed Hempel to 
approach de Yalera on the subject of arms shipments. 
"The German Government," Hempel was to tell the Irish 
34 D.G.p.p.. XI, Doc. No. 407, 718. 
35 Alfred Jodl, 1890-1946. Hitler's chief advisor on 
strategy and operations in World War II, Chief of Army 
Operations Staff, 1939-1945. Hanged at Nuremberg, 1946. 
3^ D.G.P.P. ,, XI, Doc. No. 416, 727. Irish ships were to 
travel in a circular course, entering Allied shipping routes 
west of Ireland, appearing to be en route from the U.S. 
20 
Prime Minister, "was naturally Interested in strength­
ening Ireland's power to resist" a British attack,3? 
.Germany had5 as a result of the French capitulation^ 
acquired a large number of arms abandoned by the British. 
These weapons could now be transferred, free of cost, to 
the Irish in such a way that their neutrality would not 
be threatened.^® 
Hempel informed the foreign ministry on December 7« 
that, while he had not talked with de Valera as yet, he 
had discovered that there were many influential people in 
Eire who feared that Germany might fall to support the 
Irish if Britain attacked, Hempel suggested that Berlin 
reassure Eire of its Intention to assist in the event of 
hostilities between Great Britain and Ireland, 
The German minister, seizing upon the confusion of the 
moments advised the foreign ministry that the question 
of Northern Ireland might then be openly broached by 
Germany, Neither de Valera, who sought the peaceful 
return of the northern six counties, nor any member of 
his government, had previously sought out the possibilities 
of active German aid in recovering Ulster. However, 
Hempel advised that, even if de Valera continued his 
37 D.G.F.P.. XI, Doc, No. 455, 793. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. XI, Doc, No. 466, 804. 
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non-violènt policy toward partition, visible German 
participation In the restoration of Irish unity would 
be favorably accepted when the time came. Above all, 
the Luftwaffe must continue to refrain from bombing 
cities in Northern Ireland, due to the good effect such 
a policy had in Eire. In Southern Ireland it was felt 
that the lack of attacks upon Ulster was visible proof 
that Germany regarded the North as an Integral part of 
neutral Eire.^^ 
A short time after Hempel Issued his report, he 
met with Secretary General Walshe, who advised him of 
the then current Anglo-Irish situation. Walshe believed 
that circumstances had eased the threat of a British 
invasion, although "there was always the danger of a 
sudden, reckless move" by Churchill.British anta­
gonism toward Eire had, according to Walshe, been some­
what tempered by the apparent determination of the Irish 
to resist attack. In addition, any hope which the British 
might hold of reuniting the two countries would also be 
lost if Britain took aggressive action against its 
neighbor to the west. Both Hempel and Walshe agreed 
that the primary influence on British policy during the 
continuing crisis was the opinion of the Irish living 
4^ D.G.P.P.. XI, Doc. No. 466, 804. 
41 Ibid, Doc. No. 485, 832. 
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in the United States. The reactions of the Irish-
American community had been outspoken and effective. 
The British government, not wishing to endanger its 
relations with the United States, quite naturally re­
spected the influence such activities could have upon 
the American government. The situation, as a result„ 
2 was being viewed with greater calm. 
Although the threat of invasion had-therefore sub­
sided to a degree, it nonetheless remained an important 
question in Berlin and Dublin. On December 19, Walshe 
oontaoted the German minister to discuss the question of 
the arms shipments proposed by Jodl and Ribbentrop. De 
Valera and the Irish Minister of Defense, Francis Aiken,^3 
had previously told Walshe thàt, because of the danger of 
detection, the arms could not be landed safely in Eire. If 
the British discovered the attempt, the entire episode would 
be exposed as a Nazi plot and, hence, an excellent excuse 
would be furnished for the invasion of Eire» The Irish 
government therefore abandoned the idea of importing arms from 
Axis sources until the British actually invaded. 
4^ D.G.F.P.. XI. Doo. No. 485, 832. 
^3 Francis Aiken, born 1898. Minister of Defense, 1933-
1939, Minister for Co-ordination of Defense, 1939-1945, Min­
ister for External Affairs, 1951-1954, and 1957-pre8ent. 
Deputy Prime Minister, 1965-present. 
44 D.G.F.P., XI, Doc. No. 523, 882. The German 
government was not the only Axis power of offer arms to 
23 
As 1940 drew to a close, de Yalera made what had 
become his annual Christmas speech to the United States» 
He appealed to Ireland's friends In America for aid in 
the form of weapons and foodstuffs, for which the Irish 
government would willingly pay. "At no time," the Prime 
Minister stated, "has there been friction of any kind 
between us and the belligerent Governments."^^ 
Although de Valera greatly oversimplified the 
situation, the extremely tense condition of affairs 
between Great Britain and Eire did continue to improve 
in the months following his speech. The threat to the 
British contained within the proposed German invasion of 
Great Britain began to decline In 1941 as Hitler turned 
his attention to Russia. The war at sea continued however 
to prove victorious for German submarines, and the recovery 
of the Irish bases as a consequence remained one of 
Churchill's primary remedies for what could prove to be 
a disastrous situation. 
Regardless of the still present danger from Britain, 
de Valera was able in March, 1944 to inform Hempel that 
the Irish. Minister Hempel reported In the above document 
that the "Italian Caproni concern, which is represented 
by Edgar Brand, Paris, had offered to the Irish Minister 
in Rome—incidentally with the' knowledge of the Italian 
Government—to deliver the arms which the Irish Government 
previously had ordered from Brand," 
^5 The Times (London), December 2?, 1940. 
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there were no signs at that time of an invasion by 
the British being eminent. The threat nonetheless con­
tinued in the background, and if the situation should 
change, for example by the entrance of the United States 
into the war, the British might still attack, 
When the subject of German arms shipments was once 
again raised by Berlin, de Valera remained skeptical 
that such German aid could reach Ireland unnoticed. 
However, the Prime Minister informed Hempel that he 
remained confident that "the German General Staff, even 
without Irish participation, would presumably with German 
thoroughness take the measures that seemed appropriate" 
if a crisis should develop. Following the talks, Hempel 
reported to BerllnJ.that, although chances seemed slight, 
the possibility still existed that de Valera might yet 
47 seek German assistance. 
Two days following the conversation between de Valera 
and Hempel, Warlimont reported that the 0K¥ was still 
prepared to offer only limited aid to Eire, and that in 
the form of submarine and air support. The OKW had « 
however, finished gathering large quantities of arms 
and ammunition which were then ready for shipment to Eire 
46 D.G.F.P.. XII, Dbo. No. l^O, 270. 
47 Ibid. 
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if the Irish Prime Minister consented„ 
Relations between Germany and Eire, which had been 
strengthened by the threat from Britain, rapidly deteri­
orated. as the summer of 1941 approached. At that time 
the Luftwaffe abandoned its policy of avoiding targets 
in Northern Ireland as a concession to the views of the 
South. Although the German air force had a legitimate 
reason for conducting air operations over Ulster, in that 
the British had been continuously building and strength­
ening their military installations in the area, the raids 
nevertheless had an instantly poor effect upon relations 
between Berlin and Dublin. As a result of the bombing 
missions. Irishmen on both sides of the border drew to­
gether in an equal determination to resist any aggressor. 
The situation became increasingly tense on May 31, 
when for the third time the Luftwaffe "accidentally" 
bombed Dublin, causing I50 casualties and leaving ^00 
Dubllners homeless. Five days prior to the attack de 
Valera had, before the Dail Elreann, expressed his 
government's attitude of "friendly neutrality" toward 
Great Britain. The raid, therefore, might well have 
48 D.G.F.P., XII, Doo. No. 164, 290. The arms which 
had been collected included 46 field guns, 550 machine guns, 
10,000 rifles, 1,000 antitank guns, and necessary ammunition. 
^9 Round Table, No. 124, "Divided Ireland," September, 
1941, 741-742. 
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been a reminder of what would increasingly occur If Eire 
sought closer relations with the Allies, Whatever the 
cause of the attack, its result was a momentary warming 
of relations between Eire and Great Britain. 
The British initiative, which at that moment could 
have swayed Irish opinion to the Allied cause, was lost 
due to the inept time of Winston Churchill. At the end 
of May, Churchill again felt the need to raise the question 
of conscripting Northern Irish into the British army. How­
ever» on this occasion Irish opinion became quite inflamed 
on both sides of the border. A number of Ul8termen,'who 
no doubt felt that Northern Ireland was already doing more 
than its share for the Allied cause, objected strongly to 
the proposed measure. As a result. In the first weeks of 
June, Churohill again decided to drop the matter, "although," 
as he stated, "there can be no dispute about our rights or 
the merit of the case, it would be more trouble than it is 
worth to enforce such a policy. 
•5^ Bound Table, No. 124, "Divided Ireland," September 
1941, 744-749. and Time. XXXVI, June 9, 1941, 30. After 
the war ended the attack upon Dublin was Indeed proved to 
have been an error. The R.A.F. admitted, in March, 1946, 
that it had jammed Luftwaffe radio instruments, causing them 
to inadvertantly bomb Dublin rather than Belfast, their 
original target. Time, XLVII, March 4, 1946, 29. 
51 Time, XXXVII, June 9, 1941. The simple case of 
numbers might also have Influenced Churchill, Ulster, with a 
population of 1.3 million, could only furnish approximately 
50,000 men to the British armed forces, hardly a figure worth 
causing untold difficulties over. 
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The diplomatic situation remained fluid until December, 
when the United States entered the war. As long as the 
United States had remained neutral, Britain was forced to 
take opinion In that country Into consideration when plan­
ning moves in regard to Eire. With the voice of the Irish-
American community silenced in the patriotic rush to war, a 
valuable source of opinion power was lost to Germany and Eire. 
Immediately following its declaration of war, the 
United States took the lead in attempts to convince Eire 
to abandon Its neutrality. On December 22, Roosevelt set 
the tone for the future when he dispatched a note to Dublin 
expressing his confidence that the Irish government and 
people "would know how to meet their responsibilities in 
the present situation. 
On January 26, 1942, a much more graphic example of 
the United States policy occurred. As previously arranged 
by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Acadia conference, the 
first contingent of American troops landed In Northern 
Ireland. The. reaction from Dublin was Immediate and strongly 
worded„ De Valera vehemently objected to the debarkation 
of troops on what he considered territory belonging to the 
Irish Republic and protested that he had not been consulted 
or forwarned of the decision. Fear that the American 
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Diplomatic Papers, T9QTT1II, 291-292. Here-
after cited as P.R.U.8. 
28 
forces might be employed to forcibly retake the Irish ports 
and, hence, bring about an end to Irish neutrality, led to 
a strengthening of the internal security of the island. 
Roosevelt quickly moved to placate the feelings of 
the irate Irish. Publioally, he referred to de Valera 
as an old friend, and one who would always have a standing 
Invitation to the White House. Privately, Roosevelt con­
fided in his Secretary of State Cordell Hull, that "if 
only he (de Valera) would come out of the clouds, we would 
ch. 
all have a higher regard for him."^ 
Opinion in Germany viewed the incident as yet 
another Allied diplomatic blunder, and one which could 
quite possibly improve the always fluid German-Irish 
situation. Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Reichsminister 
for Propaganda, noted that the Incident had caused a 
"great sensation" in Germany. De Valera"s reaction 
to the landing of American troops, which Dr. Goebbels 
viewed as an English-sponsored plot to intimidate the 
Irish, was stronger than had been anticipated In Lon­
don and Washington. Whatever the motivation for the 
Mary C. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation, 
(New York, 1956)« 268. Hereafter cited as Bromage, 
5^ Ibid. 
•55 Dr. Joseph Goebbels, 1897-1945. In November, 1928 
Goebbels was placed in charge of Nazi propaganda, and held 
the same position until the end of the war. 
29 
incident, Goebbels observed that the United States action 
"offends the Irish more than it enlightens them. 
The strain between Ireland and the Allies was not 
allowed to abate. On February 26, further contingents 
of United States troops landed in Northern Ireland, 
causing de Valera to once again send a strongly worded 
note to Washington. The United States was. In his opinion, 
furthering the partition of Ireland by such moves, which 
was "as indefensible as aggression against all nations 
which is the avowed purpose of Britain and the United States 
in this war to bring to an end."^^ 
In answering the Irish note. President Roosevelt was 
not as conciliatory as he had been the previous month. 
The American message contained within it the same method 
of persuasion employed by the United States later In the 
war to pressure neutral states into joining thé Allied 
fold: 
At some future date when Axis aggression 
has been crushed by the military might of 
free peoples, the nations of the earth must 
gather about a peace table to plan the future 
world on foundations of liberty and justice 
everywhere, I think It only right that I make 
plain at this time that when that time comes 
Dr. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-
1943, Louis P. Lochner, ed. & trans., (Garden City, N.Y., 
TpFo), January 29, 1942. Hereafter cited as Goebbels. 
Survey, VII, 246. 
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the Irish Government should be associated with 
its traditional friends, and, among them, the 
United States of America.5" 
If the Allies had hoped that the Irish would become 
more responsive toward their cause as a result of the 
American action, they-were proven to be mistaken. De 
Valera, pointing out that the American action was a 
threat to national security and to Ireland's Independence « 
used the incident as a means of further strengthening 
the government's position on neutrality. In Berlin, 
Goebbels gloated that, while the United States had hoped 
that Eire would join the Allied side as soon as troops 
landed In Northern Ireland, it had obviously over­
estimated thé situation» "De Valera," Goebbels stated, 
"isn't thinking of yielding to such a psychological 
squeeze."^9 
German-Irish relations, which had reached an apex 
during the period from July, 1940 to June^ 1941, steadily 
decreased in Importance in the latter stages of the war. 
Three major reasons are responsible for the decline; 
after June, 1941, with the initiation of Operation Bar-
barossa, the attention of Hitler was turned irrevocably 
upon the east; by the end of 1941 any hope of invading 
38 F.E.U.S., 1942, I, 759. 
59 Goebbels, March 6, 1942, 114, 
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Britain had slipped beyond the pale of reality; and 
finally, the Battle of the Atlantic was, by 1943, con­
sidered lost by the German naval command.As a result, 
Ireland became of nuisance value only to the crumbling 
Third Reich in the final years of the warà 
While Ireland was no longer of direct import to 
Germany, it nonetheless did Indirectly aid Berlin by 
hampering Allied diplomatic maneuvers and causing embar­
rassment in London and Washington on several occasions» 
One such incident occurred in February, 1944, when 
Roosevelt and Hull, fearing that their European invasion 
plans would be divulged through Dublin» demanded that 
Eire expel all Axis diplomats. Britain, perhaps because 
it was more familiar with Irish reactions to such affairs, 
was less enthusiastic in its acceptance of the plan but 
nevertheless followed the United States lead in the de­
mands. 
The American note, received in Dublin on February 21, 
complained that Irish neutrality had "operated and in 
fact continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers 
and against the United States.The presence of the 
German legation and Japanese consulate, the American 
note continued, provided excellent subterfuge for Axis 
60 See Chapter II, 61-62. 
61 F.E.U.8.. 1944, III, 217. 
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agents who could use the missions as a means of for­
warding Important information to their respective 
governments. After requesting, the recall of the Axis 
diplomats, the American note quite openly confessed 
that "we would be lacking in candor if we did not state 
our hope that this action will take the form of sever­
ance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and 
those two countries, 
On the following day the British note was sent to 
Dublin. The United Kingdom representative in Dublin, George 
Maffey,^^ presented the note which concurred with the 
American message and added that L-the British government 
"warmly welcomed" the American initiative in the matter. 
De Valera reacted with understandable swiftness. 
On the same day the American note was received in Dublin, 
the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  M i n i s t e r  i n  E i r e ,  D a v i d  G r a y , w a s  
infoirmed that it would be impossible to comply with any 
of the filled demands. In reaction to what was considered in 
Dublin to be a serious threat, Eire's tiny army was placed on 
62 F.R.U.8.. 1944, III, 218. 
^3 Diplomatic relations did not exist between Eire and 
Britain, and as a result, Maffey was appointed at the 
beginning of the war to the rather vague position of Britain's 
"representative" in Eire, the only link between London and 
Dublin. 
David Gray, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni­
potentiary, February, 19^0 to April, 1947, 
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the alert, leaves were cancelled, bridges mined and all 
strategically important positions guarded,^-5 
Eire's formal, and lengthy, denial of the United 
States request was received in Washington on March 10. 
After reaffirming his previous refusal, de Valera re­
minded the American president of the long history of Irish-
American relations. Eire throughout the war, de Valera 
stated, had scrupulously abided by its neutral-position, 
aad had Instituted rigid security and censorship measures 
which guaranteed that no vital information would pass 
out of the country. Finally, the Irish Prime Minister, 
in speaking of the British note, reminded Roosevelt that 
opinion in Eire toward Great Britain had greatly improved 
because that country had not violated Ireland?s neutrality. 
The Irish government finally consented to strengthen 
its security measures, and on May 1? Roosevelt agreed to 
let the matter rest. The Axis representatives nonetheless 
remained in Dublin. 
The occasion of Eire's next snub to the Allied powers 
arose on October 9, 19^4 when the United States requested 
that Eire refuse asylum to Ails war criminals. Once again, 
de Valera upheld Eire's right to remain as indiscriminately 
neutral as it wished. The Irish government, de Valera 
65 Survey, VII, 248-252. 
66 F.E.U.8., 1944, III, 233. 
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stated, could give no assurance which would hamper its 
right to grant asylum, "should justice, charity or the 
honor or interest of the nation so require.The 
Prime Minister also pointed out, rather soundly, that 
there was no precedent in international law to cover 
the American request. Furthermore, Eire had, since the 
beginning of the war, denied entrance to any alien who 
might prove at variance with national interests, and it 
would continue to do so.^^ As in the previous case, this 
issue was also allowed to rest without the Allies gaining 
Irish compliance to their demands. 
The policy of neutrality, which had become something 
of an obsession in Eire, was carried out to the final 
moments of the war. De Valera, upon hearing of Hitler's 
death at the beginning of May, 19^5, personally called 
the German legation, presenting to t!^ German repre-
sentatlves the official condolences of his government» 
While de Valera might simply have been carrying out his 
diplomatic duties, the event was viewed by most people, 
including the Irish, as an Insult directed at the Allied 
69 governments. ^ 
U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XI, November 
19, 1944, 591. 
^8 Ibid. 
69 Survey. VII, 252. 
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Eduard Hempel and his assistants were still at their 
posts in Dublin when World War II ended. The mere fact of 
their presence was a signal victory for German diplomacy, 
for it served as anlindication of Eire's indiscriminate 
neutrality until the very end of the war., While German 
diplomacy had sought throughout the war to maintain that 
neutrality, the Mllhelmstrasse was not the agency which 
gained the most benefit from Eire's neutral position. The 
German military establishment, rather than the diplomatic 
corps, made the most use of the various opportunities which 
became available.as a result of Irish neutrality. The most 
important opportunity which the Nazi military seized was the 
neutrality of the Irish sea ports and bases. 
CHAPTER II 
THE GERMAN SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, THE IRISH SEA PORTS, 
AND THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 
The Irish bases first came to the attention of the major 
powers during World War I. At the beginning of the war the 
British, while unquestionably the masters of the sea, were 
ill-prepared for the newest and most successful weapon in 
the German naval arsenal, the submarine. During the first 
months of the war, German submarines made several attacks 
upon the poorly organized defenses of the fleet headquarters 
at Scapa Flow, causing the ships in port to put to sea hur^ 
riedljo The raids upon the naval base prompted Admiral Vis-
oount Jellicoe,1 commander of the Atlantic fleet, to seek a 
more secure headquarters. 
Admiral Jellicoe, after an intensive study, decided upon 
the use of Lough Swllly, on the northwestern coast of Ire-
land, as the main base for the fleet. The Lough proved to be 
an easily defended port, in that its narrow entrance could 
be readily obstructed. In addition, the water In the Lough 
^ Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, John Rushworth, l859^i935o 
In 1910 Jellicoe was appointed Vice-Admiral in command of the 
Atlantic fleet, and in March, 1915 he became commander of the 
Grand Fleet. In I9I6, because of his performance at the 
Battle of Jutland, he was created First Sea Lord. 
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was quite shallow, thus making it extremely difficult 
p 
for German submarines to slip through while submerged» 
Accordingly, on October 23, 1914, the first contingents 
of the British fleet, the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, 
arrived at Lough Swilly. During the next months, until 
Scapa Flow was once again ready for use, the Lough re­
mained the main base for the British Atlantic fleet. Admiral 
Jellicoe later stated that, as a result of the transfer of 
the fleet to Lough Swilly, "for the first time since the 
declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure base. „ „ „ 
The relief to those responsible for the safety of the Fleet 
was immense."^ 
As the war progressed, the submarine continued its 
role as the primary weapon in the strategy of the German 
naval high command. Newer, better armed submarines, capable 
of staying at sea for longer periods of time, began to make 
an appearance in the well-traveled waters off the southern 
coast of Ireland.^ For a number of years the German U-boats 
were allowed to operate with comparative unrestricted ease 
2 Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916, 
(New York, 1919), 143. 
3 Ibid. 146. 
4 For a complete description of the convoy routes 
around Ireland, see Archibald Spicer Hurd, The Merchant Navy, 
(London, 1921). 
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in the area, due largely to the inadequate number of British 
anti-submarine forces. It was not, in fact, until the 
United States entered the war that the vital area around 
Ireland was properly defended. 
The first American military aid received by the Entente 
powers was directed toward reinforcing the anti-submarine 
campaign. The United States and Great Britain had pre­
viously reached an agreement by which the American navy 
would be allowed to stations ships at Queenstown and Bere-
haven in southern Ireland. On May 5» 1917, the first con­
tingent of American naval forces, six destroyers, arrived 
at Queenstown, and two months later a total of 34 destroyers 
were based at the I±lsh port.^ 
The Queenstown area comprised 25,000 square miles of 
water south and west of Ireland, and "up to this time had 
been badly protected. In the zone, which was so vital a 
focus of trans-Atlantic shipping, the United States Navy 
thus at once began and continued to render, a most needed 
service against the U-boats in British waters."^ 
The naval base at Berehaven, while it played a more 
minor role in the anti-submarine campaign, nonetheless 
became increasingly important during the later stages of the 
5 Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the 
World War, (Cambridge, 1927), 36-37. ~~ 
6 Ibid, 82. 
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war. In 1918, as the result of an Allied fear of the re­
appearance of the German High Seas Fleet, three of America's 
largest capital ships, the battleships Utah, Nevada and 
Oklahoma, were sent to Berehaven. When it became apparent 
that the High Seas Fleet was no longer a threat, the battle­
ships were employed on convoy duty, guarding American troop 
ships against attack as they approached the British Isles.^ 
By the end of World War I, the ships based at Queens-
town and Berehaven comprised fully one-fifth of the total 
American fo^^es in European waters, and Queenstown had 
developed into the second largest United States naval base 
O 
in Europe, exceeded only by Brest, France. 
Following World War I, the Irish ports were returned 
to the complete control of Great Britain. For the next 
twenty years they were a point of contention between the 
representatives of Britain and the newly arising Republic 
of Ireland, 
After five years of conflict (referred to in Ireland 
as the Anglo-Irish war, and in England in somewhat less 
imposing terms), an accord was reached between England and 
its rather quarrelsome neighbor to the west. By the terms 
7 Frothingham, 24^. 
® For details of the number of American ships stationed 
at Irish ports, see Appendix. 
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of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, Ireland was granted, for 
the first time in nearly 700 years, a measure of independ­
ence from Britain. 
However, the independence gained by Ireland in 1921 
was not complete. Three Important restrictions were placed 
upon the new Irish Free State: the British retained their 
right to control Irish policy In external affairs; the 
northern six counties (known collectively as Ulster) were 
allowed to remain "outside the Free State in a close union 
with Great Britain, and finally, for purposes of defense, 
the British retained the right to maintain and garrison 
the three Irish ports at Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough 
Swilly.^ 
In the seventeen years following the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty the questions of partition and Ireland's external 
association with Great Britain remained in the forefront 
of Irish demands upon the British government. The issue 
of the Irish ports, and the British personnel stationed at 
those ports, slipped into the background of Anglo-Irish 
affairs. 
In 1938 the growing tension on the European continent 
moved, for reasons of security, the Conservative government 
^ Dorothy MacArdle, The Irish Republic„ (New York., 
1965)® 592. Hereafter cited as MacArdle. 
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of Neville Chamberlain to seek closer relations with the 
Irish Free State. As a result, talks were begun in Lon­
don by Chamberlain and the Irish Prime Minister, Eamon 
de Valera. 
Chamberlain, no doubt remembering previous diffi­
culties with Ireland during wartime, came to the conclu­
sion that the possibility of having a friendly Ireland 
at England's back would be improved if he acceded to some 
Irish demands. For his part, de Valera arrived in London 
with one thought uppermost in his mind—to seek an end 
to partition. The question of the Irish ports was still 
of only secondary importance at the beginning of the dis­
cussions. 
The discussions became immediately deadlocked over the 
question of partition. Chamberlain had no desire to coerce 
the staunchly pro-British Northern Ireland into effecting a 
11 union with the South, De Valera was equally adamant In 
his demand that the northern six counties be included in 
the Republic of Ireland. As the talks reached an Impasse* 
Bromage, 263. 
Survey. VII, 233. In a genral election held on 
February 10, 1938, during which time partition was a main 
issue, Northern Ireland had reaffirmed its determination 
to stand by Great Britain rather than effecting a union 
with Southern Ireland. 
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the two prime ministers, in an effort to salvage something 
of the meeting, agreed to drop the partition issue and 
turn instead to the question of the Irish ports then held 
by the British. 
The two powers, after some months of debate, reached 
an accord in April, 1938, By the terms of the new treaty 
Great Britain agreed to transfer to the government of Eire, 
as Southern Ireland was then called, all Admiralty and 
property rights at Lough Swllly, Berehaven and Cobh (the 
name Queenstown had been replaced by the Gaelic Cobh). In 
return, de Valera promised that Eire would deny the use of 
1 2 the ports to any foreign power in the event of war. 
Chamberlain*s willingness to abandon the naval bases 
met with the approval of most members of the British govern­
ment. The Secretary of State for foreign Affairs, Lord 
Halifax,declared that the safety of the British people 
was "not diminished, but immeasurably Increased, by a free 
and friendly Ireland." The Chiefs of Staff also concurred 
Bromage, 263. 
1st Earl of Halifax, Edward Frederick Llndley Wood, 
1881-1959. From 1925 to 1931. Halifax served as the Viceroy 
of India, and from 1935 to 1937 as Lord of the Privy Seal. 
In February, 1938 he became Foreign Secretary and remained 
In thàt position until December, 19^0 when he became Ambass­
ador to the United States. 
Round Table, No. 116, "Disunited Ireland," September, 
1939, 79F: 
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with the decision, noting that If Britain were In wartime 
to secure the ^prts for naval use, a division of troops 
might be needed at each base to guard against a possibly-
hostile populaèèçn The Royal Navy was of the opinion that, 
with France as an âlly, adequate protection could be given 
Britain's shipping routes without the use of the Irish 
ports. 
Amid the general acclamation of the treaty, one voice 
was raised in protest. In the House 6f Commons, Winston 
Chruchlll, then not a member of the government, vehemently 
protested thé signing of the treaty. Churchill pointed out 
that if in the event of war de Valera decided to remain 
neutral, England's vital supply lines would be gravely 
threatened through the loss of the ports. The British 
government was "casting away real and important means of 
security and survival for vain shadows and for ease^"^^ 
The coming months were to prove Chruchlll's opinion 
to be the most accurate. 
In Germany, Britain's loss of the ports went unnoticed 
by those members of the Third Reich who were to command the 
German Submarine offensive. In January, 1939, Admiral Karl 
Doenltz, then in command of Germany's submarine forces, 
Survey, VII, 234. 
Ibid. 
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complained of the problems which the German navy would 
have to face in the coming war.^? Due to the Increased 
efficiency of the enemy air arm, he stated, German naval 
forces could no longer reach the Atlantic supply routes 
unnoticed. In addition, even If the German forces could 
reach the British shipping lanes, they would be faced with 
further difficulties: 
whereas the enemy had at his disposal ports and 
dockyards on the west coasts of the British Isles 
[including Ireland], that is, on the Atlantic 
itself, where any damage and loss of fighting 
power sustained in action could be made good, any 
crippled ship of our own would be compelled to 
undertake the long and hazardous journey back 
through the North Sea . . . before It could „ 
reach the comparative safety of German waters» 
Doenitz failed to realize, at that time, that Britain would 
be denied the use of the Irish bases on the Atlantic, or 
that Germany would itself acquire Atlantic ports after the 
fall of France. 
When the European struggle began on September 1, 1939, 
Prime Minister de Valera reiterated his long-standing 
^ Karl Doenitz, born September, 1892. After serving 
in the submarine service during World War I, Doenitz played 
a major role in the formation and training of the submarine 
command to be used by Germany in World War II. In 1942, he 
was promoted to admiral, and the following year he became 
Grand Admiral and given supreme command of the German navy 
following Admiral Erich Eaeder's resignation. From May 1-23, 
19^5s after Hitler's death, Doenitz served as head of state 
and commander in chief of the German armed forces. He was 
imprisoned by the Allies from 1946-1956 in Spandau prison. 
18 Admiral Karl Doentlz, Memoirs ; Ten Years and Twenty 
Days, (London, 1959)» 39. Hereafter cited as Doenitz. 
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intention to maintain Eire's unequivocal neutrality 
toward all powers. Combined with the declaration of neu­
trality was the automatic denial of the use of the Irish 
ports to all belligerents. To allow any of the opposing 
powers to use the pôrts would have meant an Instant abandon­
ment of neutrality and a threat to Eire's security. 
In Britain, the lack of foresight exhibited by the 
Admiralty in 1938 was still in evidence at the beginning 
of hostilities, Britain's loss of the Irish ports in war­
time had not been forseen, with the result that convoys 
were still routed around the southern coast of Ireland, an 
area where anti-submarine forces were woefully Inadequate. 
It was not until September 5 that Churchill, then First 
Lord of the Admiralty, issued his first directive concern­
ing the matter. The directive instructed the First Sea 
Lord, in rather caustic terms, to study the problem and 
submit a report on the questions arising from thè ^so-
called neutrality of the so-called Eire." Churchill took 
note of two possible problems arising from Irish neutrality 
and the loss of the ports; (1) that Irish malcontents, who 
were at thàt time conducting a terrorist campaign in Britain, 
might supply fuel and provisions to U-boats on the west 
coast of Ireland, and (2). that the efficiency of the 
British destroyers might be decreased due to the additional 
radius of action brought about by the lack of bases closer 
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to the shipping lanes. 
The value of the Irish ports became apparent in 
the early stages of the war when, immediately after the 
beginning of hostilities, the German Naval High Command, 
Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OEM), began operations 
against British shipping. Admiral Doenitz, a firm advo­
cate of submarine wolf pack tactics, had been forced by 
inadequate numbers to send single U-boats into the Atlantic 
shipping lanes.20 Accordingly, his first order called for 
the assignment of individual areas of operation off Ireland's 
western coast. After the first month of the war, German 
successes led the submarine command to issue orders for 
the intensification of submarine activities In the oper­
ational areas south and west of Ireland which, in Doenitz's 
words, had "so far shown itself to be our most profitable 
area."^1 
To insure thàt the Irish ports would remain free of 
British anti-submarine forces, the German foreign office, 
during the period of the "phony war'," sought to reassure 
Winston 8. Churchill, The Second World War, I, 
"The Gathering Storm," (Boston! 1949), 428-429. Hereafter 
cited as Churchill, I. 
Doenitz had earlier stated that Germany, if it was to 
win the-Battle of the Atlantic, needed at least 300 U-boats. 
However, at the beginning of the war he had only 57 In his 
command, of which only 20 were operational at one time. 
Doenitz, 109, passim. 
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Dublin that the Reich government would religiously re­
spect Irish neutrality—provided that Eire returned in 
kind. In November, 1939 the German Minister in Eire « 
Eduard Hempel, informed Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop 
that German policy had succeeded to the point that Great 
Britain, and not Germany, was thought to be the main threat 
to Irish security. To further strengthen the Irish In 
their determination to remain indiscriminately neutral, 
Hempel suggested that German naval forces around Ireland 
refrain from attacking ships of Irish registry, or neutral 
22 
ships bound for Ireland, Following the minister's 
suggestion, German U-boats, while taking advantage of the 
lack of anti-submarine forces, nonetheless avoided attack­
ing Irish ships. Vessels bound for Ireland were stopped, 
and, once their identity was proven, were allowed to con­
tinue on to their destination unscathed 
During the time that Germany was thus carrying on a 
successful campaign against British shipping around Ire­
land, negotiations were begun between London, Belfast and 
Dublin in an effort to find a solution to what was rapidly 
22 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 401, 466. 
23 Bound Table, No. 117, "Neutral Ireland," December, 
1939, 147. 
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becoming a serious threat to British security. In all the 
negotiations the Irish government remained adamant? de 
Valera would not consider a change in the status of the 
Irish ports until the partition question was finally set-
a '24 tied. 
To compensate for the loss of the ports in Eire, new 
bases were established at Belfast and Londonderry in 
Northern Ireland. The German submarine campaign, while 
it was somewhat hampered by the new bases, was not seriously 
restricted. Both basçs were found to be too far from the 
waters where the escorts were moèt needed. In addition, 
neither site had previously served as a naval base, and 
thus required a period of transition before they were 
ready for use. The British Admiralty soon found that 
even with the acquisition of the new bases in Northern 
Ireland, outgoing and incoming convoys could only be 
escorted to a point 200 miles west of Ireland.German 
submarines could therefore operate in comparative safety 
in all the convoy routes except those immediately adjacent 
to Britain. 
As the period of the "phony war" drew to a close, 
Edgar Hclnnls, The War; the First Year, (London, 
1945), 240-241. 
Captain 8.W. Eosklll (B.N,), White Ensign; the 
British Navy at War, 1939-1945, (Arinapolis, I960), 42. 
Hereafter cited as White Ensign. 
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some British authorities were inclined to look back upon the 
1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement as a "disinterested but short­
sighted act."^^ General Sir Edmund Ironsidê ? summed up the 
attitude of the British military when he complained in March, 
1940, "here we are fighting for our lives and, although Ire­
land is presumably in the Empire, we cannot use her western 
harbours for our destroyers. They would save us 200 miles 
each war. Is there any other nation that would tolerate in a 
O Q  
life-struggle being denied something vital." 
The German direction of World Mar II, and particularly 
the Battle of the Atlantic, reached its apex during the 
period from July, 19^0 to June, 1941. It was during that 
period that Prance fell before the German Blitzkrieg » thus 
giving Germany much needed bases on the Atlantic and allow­
ing Hitler to issue the orders for Operation Sea Lion, the 
invasion of Britain. Doenitz's submarine command, with 
its main base located at Brest, was also able to greatly 
intensify the attack upon convoys destined for Britain. 
White Ensign, 42, 
General Sir Edmund Ironside, 1880-1959. Serving as a 
brigadier, in 1918, Ironside was on the General Staff to the 
Allied expedition in Archangel, and in 1920 he led the British 
military expedition to Hungary. Between September, 1939 and 
May, 1940 he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He 
retired in July, 1940 after serving two months as Commander 
in Chief, Home Forces. 
28 General Sir Edmund Ironside, The Ironside Diaries, 
1937-1940. (London, 1962), 23. 
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In July, 1940, as a result of the German possession 
of bases in the Bay of Biscay, use of the convoy approaches 
around the southern coast of Ireland was discontinued. 
From that time until the final months of the war, convoys 
used what became known as the northwest approach. Ships 
leaving North America" rendezvoused at Greenland and pro­
ceeded to Britain on a northerly route, entering British 
waters around Northern Ireland. Those convoys which came 
from South America, the Mediterranean, and around the Cape 
of Good Hope, followed the African coast and, upon entering 
the North Atlantic, widely skirted western Ireland and used 
the northwest approaches to reach their British ports. With 
the change in the convoy routes, Cobh, on the southwestern 
coast of Ireland, lost its importance as a possible base. 
However, Lough Swilly and Berehaven remained of interest 
as possible bases of anti-submarine and escort forces. 
Doenitz had anticipated that with the change > in the 
convoy routings ships destined for Britain would for de­
fensive purposes become widely scattered. The submarine 
command was pleasantly surprised when, because of inade­
quate escort forces, the convoys continued to stay within 
the well-defined shipping lanes in the northwest approaches» 
While the submarine command was thus aided by Britain's 
^9',Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, I, "The Defense," 
(London, 195^), 2ÏÏ3T Hereafter cited as The War at Sea. 
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adversity, Deonltz was nevertheless still hampered by 
an old problem; the lack of sufficient air reconn­
aissance. The U-boats J which throughout the war gained 
successes far out of proportion to their numbers, could 
not fully accomplish their mission unless they could 
first find the enemy. In the years prior to the out­
break of war, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder,^^ commander 
in chief of the German navy, had attempted to promote an 
independent naval air arm, but had met with the stubborn 
resistance of Heichsmarschall Hermann Goerlng who, in 
addition to his other positions, was also commander of 
31 
the Luftwaffe.. Goerlng, whom Doenitz described as taking 
the attitude .that "everything that flies belongs to met" 
refused to allow the creation of a rival air force, but did 
consent to transfer a small number of air reconnaissance 
craft to the navy. The submarine command found these 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, I876-I96O. Raeder entered 
the German navy In 1894, and by 1922 was a Rear Admiral, In 
1939 he was named Admiral of the Fleet, the first since Tir-
pitz. He resigned In 19^3 after several altercations with 
Hitler, Raeder was Imprisoned from 1946 to I956 by the Allies. 
Hermann"Goerlng, 1893-1946. When Hitler came to power 
In 1933» he named Goerlng Reichamlnlster, commissioner for 
air, Prussian Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, In 
1935 he became RelchSùiiaister for Air and Commander in Chief 
of the Luftwaffe, and the following year he was placed in 
charge of the Four Year Plan. In 1939 he was name Hitler's 
successor, and the next year received the exclusive title of 
Re1chsmarschall. In 1945 he was expelled from all offices, 
and the following year committed suicide while a prisoner of 
the Allies. 
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additional forces to be 
meagre in the extreme. So acute was the lack 
of air craft possessed of necessary range, that 
it was only now and then that one solitary 
machine was made available to fly one solitary 
sortie—and then only over the areas southwest 
of Ireland,32 
The submarine command was thus unable to carry out 
reconnaissance on the well traveled areas off north-
western Ireland. However, scattered reports reaching 
Brest from flights over southwestern Ireland did prove 
to be of value. During July, 1940, German U-boats sank 
38 ships of 196,000 tons, including the troop transport 
Mohammid All el Kabir which, because of the lack of 
bases in Eire, was excorted by only one vessel at the 
time when it sank off the Irish coast. 
Although the submarine arm of the German navy was 
s t i l l  h a m p e r e d  b y  a  l a c k  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  n u m b e r s , i t  
nonetheless operated with considerable success during 
the summer of 1940. In the period from May to Dotbber, 
28? Allied and neutral ships were stink, of a total 1.5 
32 Doenltz, 132-134. 
The War at Sea. I, 349, 
3^ In the year between September, 1939 and September, 
1940, 28 new U-boats had been added to the original fleet 
of 57 submarines. However, in thé same period 28 were also 
lost, leaving Doentlz with a command as small as at the 
beginning of hostilities. Doenltz, 109» 
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million tons,^^ By far the most successful month in the 
period was October, when the U-boats accounted for the 
loss of 63 ships, including the Canadian Pacifie liner 
Empress of Britain (42,348). The Empress was torpedoed 
and sunk by the U-32 on October 23 » two days after it 
had been bombed and set afire while 70 miles west of 
Donagal Bay, Ireland. Captain 8.W. Roskil (E.N.) attrib­
utes the death of the ship, the only one of the "giant 
liners" to be sunk during the war, to the fact that once 
again sufficient escorts could not be sent to the stricken 
s h i p  b e f o r e  i t  w a s  t o r p e d o e d , ,  
During the same period relations between Berlin and 
Dublin became somewhat strained following Luftwaffe attacks 
upon a ship of Irish registry, the 8.8. Kerry Head. The 
German foreign office admitted the attacks on August 30, 
and expressed regret over the incident. Unfortunately, 
Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe was, at times, prone to make 
the same mistake twice. On October 22 German planes once 
again attacked the Kerry Head while it steamed off the coast 
of Cork in southern Ireland. The second attack was more 
successful, resulting in the sinking of the ship and the 
loss of all hands. 
Doenitz, 108» 
36 The War at Sea. 351-352. 
37 Round Table, No. 121, "Ireland in the Vortex," 
December, 1940, 118=119. 
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Relations between the two countries had, as a result 
of the Kerry Head incident, reached a delicate stage by 
the end of October, However, at the beginning of Nov-
ember the situation was entirely reversed, when German-
Irish ties became firmer than at any other period during 
the Second World War, 
The stimulus for the improvement in relations came 
not from Ireland or Germany, but from Great Britain. On 
November 5« Prime Minister Winston Churchill, speaking 
before the House of Commona, denounoed de Valera for his 
stand on the question of the ports, pointing out that, 
"the fast that we cannot use the south and west approaches 
of Ireland . . . and thus protect trade by which Ireland, 
as well as Great Britain, lives, that fact Is a most gr^ 
"ewos burden and one which should Jnever have been placed 
upon our shoulders, broad though they may be." Churchill 
also implied that German submarines were being supplied 
with fuel and provisions in Irish ports, 
De Valera viewed Churchill's comments as something 
akin to a causas belli. On November 7, speaking before 
the Dall Elreann, the Prime Minister alerted his nation 
to the threat posed by Churchill's speech: 
38 Time. XXXVI, November 18, 1940, 26-2?. 
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I want to say to our people, we may ie 
facing a grave crisis, , , , There can be no 
question of handing over these ports so long 
as this country remains neutral. They are 
ours and within our sovereignty » , , any 
attempt by any of the belllgerents^-Great 
Britain—would ionly lead to Bloodshed, So 
long as this Government remains In office we 
shall defend our rights In respect of these 
ports or any part of our territory whosoever 
may attack them. 
De Valera concluded by stating that Eire hadbever harbored 
or supplied German submarines. 
In the three weeks following Churchill's November 5 
speech, a number of notes were exchanged between the German 
Minister Eduard Hempel and Ribbentrop, discussing the in­
creasingly tense situation. 
On November 29» following discussions with the Irish 
Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Walshe, Hem-
pel advised his foreign office that there was fear in 
certain circles of the Irish government that the British, 
"reckoning on the Impending loss of their position in 
Europe and the Mediterranean . , . would attach special 
importance to having possession of Ireland when the new 
The Times (London), November 8, 1940. 
The only reason, during this period of the war, 
that German submarines were known to have landed in Eire 
was to debark survivors of torpedoed ships. Round Table, 
December, 1939» 14?. 
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order Is established."^^ The question of the ports might 
be used as an excuse to accomplish this task, 
Hempel further stated that the Irish had started pre= 
parations for the possible defense of their country. The 
Irish army, consisting of 150,000 men including reserv­
ists, was prepared to carry on the defense of Eire by 
employing guerilla tactics or by launching an attack 
upon Northern Ireland. If German military aid was sought, 
as Bëmpel assumed it would, that assistance would probably 
come in the form of early effective action by the Luftwaffe, 
However, military aid was not to be the only type of support 
given Eire. Keeping in mind the always delicate partition 
question, Hempel suggested that, 
of at least equal importance to the early 
arrival of German B&llitary] aid in the event 
of an English attack is in my opinion a 8lmul= 
taneous German declaration . . . that we will 
champion the complete independence of a united 
Ireland from England at the peace negotiations 
to come. The Irish determination to resist 
would thus be greatly strengthened from the 
outset by us too.^^ 
De Valera, while expressing appreciation for the 
offer, declined to accept any such assistance until 
Britain made an actual move to forcibly reolain the ports. 
D.G.F.P.. XI, Doc. No. 419, 736. 
Ibid. 
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While the diplomatic maneuvers were being carried 
out In the background, the German submarine command was 
successfully conducting the blockade of Britain, which 
had originally prompted Churchill to make his House of 
Commons address. In November, British food imports 
dropped below one million tons for the first time since 
the war began.This was again due to the serious lack 
of protection for the convoys, resulting from the loss 
of the Irish ports and the ever^deoreasing number of 
destroyers available for escort duty. The situation 
grew worse as the threat of invasion by Germany contin­
ued, causing the Admiralty to withdraw still more destroyers 
from convoy and anti-submarine duty and place them in 
defensive positions In the areas directly threatened by 
invasion. 
After Churchill's direct approach to de Valera had 
failed, he turned to other, more Indirect, sources of 
persuasion. The United States, with its large population 
of Irish-Americans, was in an excellent position to bring 
pressure to bear upon Eire. Churchill felt that President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt could, while maintaining his country's 
neutrality, contribute more toward the successful con­
clusion of the Battle of the Atlantic. In a telegram 
Laurence Thompson, 1940, (New York, 1966), 229. 
Hereafter cited as Thompson, 
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iih 
to Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Churchill 
had earlier complained that Roosevelt had not as yet 
given any practical aid, such as destroyers, planes, 
"or by a visit of a squadron of their Fleet to Southern 
Irish ports. After the fall of France the United States 
had, indeed, given 50 destroyers to Britain, but In Deo= 
ember, 1940, few of those ships were in seaworthy condi­
tion,^^ 
Churchill wrote Roosevelt in December that, as a 
result of the overextension of British flotillas, the 
continued export to Eire of 400,000 tons of foodstuffs and 
fertilizers would be halted, "Perhaps," wrote Churchill, 
this may loosen things up and make him [de Valera] 
more ready tô consider common interests, , , . you 
will realise also that our merchant seamen, as well 
as public opinion generally, take It much amiss 
that we should have to carry Irish supplies through 
air and U-boat attacks and subsidize them hand-
somely when de Valera,is quite content to sit happy 
and see us strangle. 
Throughout the winter, the British Prime Minister con­
tinued to seek additional American assistance for the pro­
tection of the Atlantic convoys. Such protection could, 
Churchill theorized, be immensely more effective if the 
William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874=1950» King served 
as Prime Minister of Canada from 1921-1926, 1926-1930 and 
1935-1948, longer than any other holder of the office, 
Thompson, 183. 
Churchill, I, 6o6, 
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United States could aoqulre bases in Eire for the dur­
ation of the war. If such a case was impossible, the 
good offloes of the United States, as well as Its oonald= 
erable Influence, might be used to exert pressure on Eire 
to change its position.^? 
The resultant pressure which was brought to bear 'iipon 
Eire caused the Irish Minister to the United States, Robert 
Brennan, to explain that Eire could not consider the cession 
or lease of the ports to either side, since such a 
would undoubtedly bring the war to Ireland: 
The Irish dldn*t fight 700 years for their 
survival as a nation In order now to embark 
upon a policy which would Invite annihilation 
. . . the map clearly showe that the ports 
would be useful to Britain, Could It not also 
be used to show they would be useful to Germany, 
and will anyone contend that Germany would be 
(equally) justified In demanding them on the 
grounds of their usefulness.^" 
Germany, however, had no Intention of forcibly 
taking the Irish ports. It had already been seen that the 
ports. In the hands of an Indiscriminately neutral Eire, 
were of Inestimable value to the operation of the sub­
marine command In the Atlantic. Therefore, Germany con= 
tlnued 6n the whole to respect Irish neutrality and avoid 
trouble with Dublin. 
Churchill, I, 563* 
Time, XXXVI, December 2, 1940, 6. 
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The year 19^1 served as a turning point in the 
operations of the German military, and subsequently. 
In the relative Importance of Ireland and the Irish 
ports. The emphasis on the Battle of the Atlantis de= 
creased with the beginning of the Russian campaign, the 
entrance of the United States into the war, and the grow= 
ing importance of the North African campaign. However, 
for the first six months of 1941 the area around Ireland 
nonetheless remained a major focal point for the German 
naval command, 
Doenltz, early In 1941, had transferred a number of 
his available U-boats from the North Atlantic to the 
Freetown, Sierra Leone region. When submarine activities 
In that area met with considerable success, the British 
reduced Freetown shipping to a bare mlnlmun, with the 
result that Doenltz once again recalled the U-boats to 
the North Atlantic. Operating south and west of Ireland 
with increased air reconnaissance, the German submarines 
were able to exact a heavy toll on shipping en rotate to 
Britain from the Mediterranean.^9 
The lack of bases in Eire, while It still aided the 
German submarine campaign,,in the waters south of Ireland, 
was beginning to have less effect in the north. German 
submarine commanders operating in the northern approaches, 
49 Doenltz, 177. 
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where air reconnaissance was still not available, began 
to encounter increased opposition by the Royal Air Force, 
Submarine command discovered that the U-boats, if and when 
they coùld find a convoy, where frequently driven off by 
planes flying from bases in Northern Ireland, By mid-19^1 
the R.A.F, had established a "safe" area, extending from 
the coast of Ireland westward for 400 miles, wherein the 
convoys could traval with relative security. In July and 
August, 19^1» the effect of the increased air cover was 
felt to the extent that submarine command reported the sink­
ing of only ^5 ships.As the R.A,P. acquired newer air­
craft of a longer range, the "safe" zone was extended to the 
point that acquiring bases in Southern Ireland was not the 
problem it had been during the first two years of the war. 
The period between the autumn Of'19^1 and spring of 
1924.3 was marked by the steady deterioration of the U-boat 
phase of the Battle of the Atlantic. The advanced efficiency 
of the R.A.F, anti-submarine measures, the addition of a 
great number of escort vessels due to the entrance of the 
United States into the war, and the increased use of radar 
and other technical advances prompted Doenitz, in May, 19^3» 
to confess that Germany had lost the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Doenitz, 273 
51 Ibid. 
62 
Although the Battle of the Atlantic was considered lost 
in 19^3» U-boat" aetiirities did not cease. Indeed, the pro­
duction of newer» more deadly submarines enabled the German 
U-boat command to harass the efforts of the Allied merchant 
flèets until the last days of the war.^Z As a result, Doe-
nitz continued to send individual submarines into the waters 
surrounding Ireland—waters which could not be called com­
pletely safe due to the denial of the Irish ports to the 
Allies. 
The United States, after its entry into ihë.war, had 
taken the lead in attempting to coerce Eire into relinquish­
ing its ports. In 19^3» Roosevelt's secretary of state, 
Gordell Hull,^^ once again raised the question of acquiring 
the Irish bases. Hull believed that "without question the 
air and naval facilities in Ireland would be of considerable 
usefulness to the United Nations' war effort," but hesitated 
about the course to take to acquire the bases,-5^ The secret­
ary of state, perhaps thinking of the reaction among Irish-
Americans, believed that the matter should.be handled in a 
52 In 1943 plans were begun for the construction of two 
new U-boats, the Type XXI, with a submerged speed of 25 knots, 
aM the $ype XXIII, a smaller craft with a submerged speed of 
12 knots. Although a few were made ready before the end of 
the war (see page 65)» they were not scheduled to become fully 
operational until 1946. Doenitz, 35^-356. 
53 Gordell Hull, 1871-1955. Hull served as senator from 
Tennessee, 1931-1933, and Secretary of State, 1933-1944. 
54 Gordell Hull, Memoirs of Gordell Hull, II, (New York, 
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quiet, diplomatic fashion. To take strenuous action against 
Eire might appear, in some circles, that the United States 
was taking the side of Britain against the Irish and, hence, 
that the United States was once again "pulling British chest­
nuts out of the fire."^^ 
The matter was eventually turned over to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, who were to conduct a study of the military 
importance of the ports. The Joint Chiefs came to the 
conclusion that, while the value of the bases on the 
United Nations overall war effort could not be exactly 
foretold, their possession would prove a definite aid In 
future strategic planning. Consequently, Hull decided 
that de Valera might be Induced to lease the bases to his 
country's ancient friend and ally, the United States. 
Before approaching the Irish Prime Minister, Hull first 
sought out British opinion on the matter. The British 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden,^^ advised that de 
Valera would never agree to leasing the bases, and that 
stronger action "would likely give rise to acute diffi­
culties, "57 Hull eventually concurred with Eden's opinion, 
55 Hull, II, 1356-1357. 
56 Anthony Eden, born 1897. In December, 1940 Eden was 
named Foreign Secretary, From 1951-1955 he served as Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and became Prime Min­
ister in 1955* serving until 1957. 
57 Hull, II, 1357. 
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and in December, 1943» the matter was dropped. The question 
of acquiring the Irish ports was not raised again for the 
duration of the war. 
Throughout 1944 the U-boat campaign was carried out 
in much the same manner as in the previous years. While 
the measures taken against the submarines continued to 
achieve success, the U-boats did score periodic victories 
which proved costly to the Allies, The situation became 
Increasingly more difficult for the submarine command when, 
after the Allied invasion of Europe and the subsequent lib­
eration of France, the German navy was once again denied 
direct access to the Atlantic. 
After the German-occupied French ports had been re­
claimed by United Nations' forces, the Allies concluded 
that It was once again safe to resume the use of the south­
ern approaches to Britain, Ships en route from the Medit­
erranean and Freetown could therefore use the shorter, 
more direct route through the waters off Southern Ireland 
to reach such British shipping centers as Portsmouth, Ply­
mouth and Liverpool. 
The German submarine command also realized that 
traffic in the southern approaches would be resumed and 
accordingly transferred a number of boats to the area 
south of Ireland and in the Irish Sea. , The first months 
of 1945 were, as a consequence, more successful than any 
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in the previous year. 
In the first days of January, U-boat command trans­
ferred 20 submarines to the southern approaches. By the 
end of the month 39 were in the area. Including the first 
of the Type XXIII boats (U-2324), The Royal Navy, as a 
result of the resumption of trade in the south, was forced 
to withdraw some of Its forces from the north, with the 
result that submarines were able to operate in the North 
Foreland for the first time since the second year of the 
war.59 
During the final months of the war German efforts 
were centered in the Irish Sea. Despite heavy concen­
trations of anti-submarine forces in the area, the U-boats 
gained a volume of sinkings serious enough to cause concern 
in the Admiralty, Among the most successful of the sub­
marines was the U-1055 which, between January 9-11, sank 
three ships. The U-1302 also âucceeded, on March 2, in 
sinking two ships in a single convoy. 
The European war ended with Lough Swilly, Berehaven 
and Cobh still firmly in Irish hands. It is difficult to 
estimate, in the strict limitations of weeks and months, 
58 See Rosklll, III, 291^495. 
59 Ibid. 291-292. 
60 Ibid. 295. 
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to what extent the Allied possession of the ports would 
have shortened the war. However, It is nonetheless safe 
to assume that, had the Allies been able to station the 
same number of anti-submarine forces in Ireland that they 
possessed in the First World War, the efforts of the 
German submarine command would have been greatly hampered, 
and the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost much 
sooner. 
CHAPTER III 
TEE ABWEHR IN NEUTRAL EIRE 
I 
On the morning of May 23, 19^7, Major Hermann Goertz, 
Germany's most successful agent provacateur In Ireland, 
committed suicide while he awaited deportation to his native 
Germany, The death of Goertz marked the final entry in the 
history of Nazi Germany's attempts to establish an Intelli­
gence network in Eire and a liaison with the "dark forces," 
as Churchill called them, of Ireland's underground national­
istic militia, the Irish Republican Army, Although the 
story thus ended in post-war Dublin, one must look much 
farther back than the Second World War to find Its beginning. 
Indeed, to discover the roots of the question. It Is nec­
essary to study the era wherein Europe was dominated, not 
by Hitler's Germany, but by the Germany of Kaiser Wllhelm II. 
In 1914, military and foreign affairs officers In Ger­
many, faced with a war they had not started and enemies on 
both their eastern and western borders, sought ways in which 
they might diminish the power or number of their adversaries, 
Ireland presented such an opportunity, 
Ireland in 1914 was a country on the brink of civil war. 
6? 
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The long-sought Home Rule Bill was about to become a reality, 
but not without the stubborn resistance of many elements In 
Ireland, The Protestants of Ulster Province, who advocated 
union with Britain, were prepared if necessary to offer armed 
resistance to Inclusion with the rest of Catholic Ireland as a 
autonomous state. Republican factions in southern Ireland 
were equally disenchanted with anything less than complete 
independence and the formation of an Irish Republic. 
As a result of the existing conditions In Ireland, many 
circles In Berlin advocated giving active support to the 
Irish. The advocates of German-Irish cooperation falsely 
speculated that Britain, faced as it was with rebellion in 
Ulster and continued republican agitation throughout the 
rest of Ireland, would be in no position to sustain a con­
tinental war at the same time.^ 
During the period preceding the outbreak of war, Ger-
many showed Itself to bê Indiscriminate in Its aid to the 
Irish, supplying material to both royalist and republican 
alike. On April 24, 1914, German gun runners landed a 
shipment of 3^,000 Mauser rifles for the Ulster loyalists 
2 at Larne, County Antrim, In June, Captain Earnon de Valera, 
^ Edgar Holt, Protest in Arms ; the-Irish Troubles, 
1916-1923, (New York, 1961), 60. Hereafter cited as Holt. 
^ Dorothy MacArdle, The Irish Republic» (New York, I965), 
110. Hereafter cited as MacArdle. 
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in command of E Company, Dublin Brigade^ôf -the republican 
Irish Volunteers, received orders to march his men north of 
the city, where they were to receive a shipment of Mauser 
rifles from Germany, Similar cargoes were also landed south 
of Dublin.3 
Throughout the summer preparations for the forthcoming 
hostilities continued among both factions in Ireland, and it 
was not until September that the situation notioably changed. 
On September 14 royal consent was at last given to the Home 
Rule Bill. Unfortunately, due to the European war which had 
begun the previous month, enactment of the measure was tem^)-
porariTy postponed, A year later the British government sus-
h pended the bill for the duration of the war. 
The passage and subsequent postponement of the bill 
created spontaneous reactions among the Irish, Although 
the postponement of the measure alleviated some fears of 
the Ulster loyalists, they were nevertheless in no way 
pleased that Home Rule had been placed in the statutes of 
Great Britain. Among the republicans, the bill as it 
stdod represented little more than a mere "scrap of 
paper. "-5 Even before the passage of the measure, on 
3 
Mary C. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation, 
(New York, 1956), 36-37. Hereafter cited as Bromage. 
^ MacArdle, 118 and 133. 
5 Ibid, 118. 
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September 5 during a meeting of the Supreme Counùll of the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood,^ the decision had been reached 
militarily to rise against British rule. The postponement of 
the Home Rule Bill therefore served only to Increase an 
already inflamed situation. 
The position of the republican military arm in any con­
flict with Britain was, at the least, extremely tenuous„ It 
therefore became Imperative to seek outside assistance. Of 
the various sources available, two were more important than 
any others s the Irish in the United States, who had organ­
ized into various nationalistic organizations prepared to 
render aid to their former homeland, and Imperial Germany, 
whloh oould offer not only military assistance, but also 
polltloal recognition and financial aid. 
While a link was being formed between the I.R.B. in 
Dublin, the Clan na Gael? in New York and the Imperial 
government in Berlin, yet another factor was added to the 
already confused situation. In October, 1914, Sir Roger 
Casement,® an Irish patriot knighted for his humanitarian 
^ Irish Republican Brotherhood, (I.R.B.) the fore­
runner of the Irish Republican Army, 
7 Clan na Gael, the strongest of the nationalistic 
Irish organizations in the United States. 
® Sir Roger Casement, 1864-1916» Served as British 
Consul in Portugese East Africa, Angola and the Congo Free 
State. Arrested for anti-British activities April 24, 1916, 
and hanged on August 3» 
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service in Africa, sailed from New York for Geimany. 
Casement's self-appointed mission consisted of the search 
for a clear agreement with Germany in which the Imperial 
government would supply material to the Irish in their 
struggle with Great Britain. Sir Roger, whose ideas were 
shared by many in Irish republican circles, took the view 
that: 
Ireland has no quarrel with the German people 
or just case of offense against them , . , there 
is no gain, moral or material. Irishmen can 
draw from assailing Germany, The destruction 
of the German Navy or the sweeping of German 
commerce from the seas will bring no profit 
to a people whose own commerce was long since 
swept from land and sea . , , no Irishman fit 
to bear arms in the cause of his country's 
freedom can join the allied millions now attack­
ing Germany In a war that, at the best, concerns 
Ireland not at all, and that can only add fresh 
burdens and establish a new drain. In the inter­
ests of a another community, upon a people that 
has already been bled to the verge of death.9 
Sir Roger sought specifically, during his seventeen 
month mission to Germany, to gain an official German 
statement of its support and friendship, raise a brigade 
from among Irish prisoners of war, and secure military 
assistance for the struggle against Britain. His success 
was limited to an official announcement by the German 
government, in the November 20, 1914 issue of Norrdeusohe 
9 Peter Singleton-Gates, The Black Diaries of Sir Roger 
Casement, (New York, 1959)» 358. Hereafter cited as 8ingle-
ton-Gates. 
10 MaoArdle, 127-129. 
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Allp;emelne Zeltung, that it held a friendly attitude toward 
the Irish people and hoped for success in their struggle 
for independence. Beyond this statement, however* Casement's 
mission failed. The Irish p.o.w.*8 proved unwilling to 
abandon their British and French comrades-in-arms, and as a 
result; the Irish Brigade numbered only fifty-two men when 
Casement left Germany, In addition, the Imperial government 
proved hesitant to provide the 200,000 rifles, artillery 
pieces and ammunition, together with German "advisors," 
11 
that the Irish nationalist requested. 
During the period that Sir Roger Casement was in 
Germany, the Irish Republican Brotherhood had completed 
plans for the rebellion against British authority to begin 
on Easter Monday, 1916. To help equip Its fozroes, the 
I.R.B. requested, through its representatives in the Clan 
na Gael, that Berlin send arms and ammunition to Ireland. 
The German government consented, and on April 9 the 
steamer And, disguised as Norwegian, left Luebeck with a 
cargo of 20,000 rifles and ammunition. The Aud, after 
suooessfully avoiding British patrols, arrived at Its 
destination in Tralee Bay In southwestern Ireland, Unfor­
tunately, the ship reached the bay two days before its 
MacArdle, 127-129. Casement's proposal to form an 
Irish Brigade was not particularly unique. Detachments of 
Irish troops had previously taken part in most continental 
wars, and as late as 1898 an Irish Brigade had been formed 
to take part in the Boer War—on the side of the Boers, 
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agreed arrival time. While awaiting the arrival of Irish 
crews to unload the weapons, it was discovered by elements 
of the Royal Navy. To keep the weapons from falling Into 
British hands, the German crew scuttled the ship before 
It could be searched at the Queenstown Naval Base. As a 
result, Irish revolutionaries, particularly in the area 
outside Dublins were badly in need of arms and ammunition 
1P when the Easter Rising began. 
The leaders of the Rising were well aware of their 
unstable position and hence had little hope of an ultimate 
military victory. They did, however, hope to hold the 
British off long enough to raise the patriotic ardor 
of all of Ireland, proclaim the Republic, declare war on 
Britain, and henoe be reoognlzed as a belligerent power 
under International law (not that the British needed to be 
reminded of Irish belligerency) and entitled to take part 
In the peace conference to follow the European war.^^ In 
their estimates of the military situation at least, the 
Irish leaders were correct. Six days after the trl-color 
had been raised, the last Irish Insurgent surrendered to 
the British. 
The Rising, which had never taken hold outside the 
city of Dublin, might well have gone down In history as 
Holt, 118. 
13 MaoArdle, I56-I57. 
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yet another abortive Irish attempt at gaining IndepeM-
ence had it not been for the violent British reprisals 
i /i 
Which followed. General Sir John Maxwell, In command 
of the British forces and soon to be known as "Bloody 
Maxwell" by the Irish, dealt with dispatch in the matter 
of the revolutionary officers who had surrendered. After 
a peremptory court martial, each was executed by a British 
firing squad. 
Chief among the charges brought against the leaders 
of the Rising, including Casement (who had been captured 
after his return to Ireland a few days prior to the rebel­
lion) was their supposed connection with Germany, In 
Britain, as well as in certain circles in Ireland, it was 
believed that Germany had played a major role In the up­
rising, Among the Irishmen condemning the Insurgents for 
their association with Germany was John Redmondleader 
of the Irish Parliamentary Party. Redmond, in describing 
the Rising, stated that "Germany plotted it, Germany organ­
ized it, Germany paid for It."^^ Although a gross over­
estimate of the extent of German aid, Redmond's statement 
Gen. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell, 1859-1929. Sir John 
commanded British forces in India, 1914-1916, and was British 
commander In chief of the forces In Ireland after the Rising, 
15 MacArdle, 185» 
John Redmond, I856-I9I8. Leader of the I.P.P. 
17 Holt, 118-119. 
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nonetheless had a semblance of truth to it. By the time 
of the Easter Rising, everyone in Ireland had become 
familiar with Casement's mission to Germany, In addition, 
the leaders of the rebellion had not been silent in their 
appreciation of German aid. In the proclamation which 
established the provisional government of the Republics 
issued on Easter Monday, they stated that the rebellion 
had begun with the support of Ireland's "children in 
America and by gallant allies in Europe."18 The presid­
ing officers at the British court martials and civil 
trials which followed Easter week had little doubt to whom 
the "allies in Europe" referred. 
Maxwell's efforts to repress the Irish nationalists, 
which at times took on an inquisition-like aura, caused 
opinion in Ireland to become fused into one policy as it 
had never before. Public sentiment, which had been lacking 
during the Rising, became inflamed to the point that a war 
of rebellion erupted throughout Ireland, 
Germany did not neglect to maintain ties with Ireland's 
underground forces. On several occasions, submarines were 
reported to have landed on the Irish coast, and as late 
as April, 1918, the British discovered German "plots" in 
Ireland, On that occasion, one Joseph Bowling, an ex-
18 "Proclamation of the Irish Republic" cited in 
MacArdle, l68. 
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corporal in the Connaright Rangers and a member of Casement's 
Irish Brigade, had "been captured off the coast of County Clare. 
It was shortly thereafter discovered that Dowllng had acted 
under orders of the German General Staff, which wished to 
find out the prospects for yet another uprising in Ireland„ 
Although the Irish republicans apparently knew nothing of 
Bowling*s mission, the British used the occasion as a ready 
excuse to re-arrest revolutionary military and political 
leaders who had escaped death after the Easter Rising, 
German-Irish underground relations continued during 
the period following World War I, In 1920, Robert Briscoe, 
the representative of the Irish Republican Army^O in 
Germany, succeeded in purchasing arms from non-official 
sources» Shipments of small consignments of arms ensued, 
and as late as 1921 a ship of German registry, the Frieda, 
was stopped by German authorities and, after being searched, 
its cargo was found to be arms Intended for the I.R.A.^l 
Although all German contacts with Irish underground 
forces were seemingly broken after 1921, one event was yet 
to occur in the pre-World War II period in which both would 
participate. The Spanish Civil War had in 1936 aroused 
19 MaoArdle, 253-254. 
20 By 1919, the Irish Republican Brotherhood had 
assumed the name Irish Republican Army, 
21 MacArdle, 400 and 539» 
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the interest of all Europe, but particularly Germany and 
Italy, Germany, and in part Italy, was inclined to look 
upon the struggle as a ready means of testing recently ae^. 
quired military machines. In Ireland, where sentiments are 
always easily aroused, volunteers came forward for both 
sides of the Spanish conflict. 
One of the more noted of the Irish volunteers was 
Frank Ryan. Ryan was leader of the left-wing Congress 
Party (which had previously broken from I.E.A. ranks) and 
editor of the republican weekly newspaper. An Phoblaoht. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the civil war, Ryan joined 
the Lincoln-Washington Brigade, made up largely of Irish-
Americans, and by 1938 had risen to the rank of Acting 
Brigadier of the Brigade, In the summer of that year, 
while taking part in action in the Ebro Valley* he was 
wounded and taken prisoner by Franco's Italian allies. 
Two years later, Ryan still languished in a Spanish jail 
after all efforts to secure his release had failed, 
Ryan was not, however, the only Irish political-
military leader to take part in the Spanish Civil War. 
General Eoin 0'Duffy, who like Ryan had at one time been 
connected with the I.E.A., was a prominent member of the 
Irish political scene. After the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
Op 
Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland, (Harrisburg, P.A., 
1965)» 157. Hereafter cited as Stephan, 
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0'Duffy had broken with the I.R.A, and had followed the 
pro-treaty party of William Cosgrave.^^ In 1933» he was 
placed in command of the National Guard, a fascist organ­
ization also known as the Blue Shirts, which had been 
formed to counter the power of the "red" Irish Republican 
Army, With the coming of the civil war in Spain, 0'Duffy 
raised a 700 man force of Irish Volunteers which, under 
the name of the 15th Bandera, became part of Franco's 
forces on the Madrid front. Following six months of fight­
ing, O'Duffy's troops were recalled to Ireland after Eamon 
de Valera, then Prime Minister and president of the League 
of Nations, had proclaimed Ireland's non-interventionist 
2Li 
policy toward Spain. 
During the subsequent war years, both Ryan and 0'Duffy 
Were to play important roles in the efforts of the German 
intelligence office to create an explonage system in Ireland. 
By the beginning of 1939» the German Abwehr (intelli­
gence service), under the direction of Admiral Wilhelm 
Canaris,25 had become an extensive organization emplpylng 
23 William Cosgrave, born 1880. Head of state of the 
provisional government, 1922-1932, opposition leader during 
World War II. 
Stephen, 28. 
Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the German Abwehr, 
1934 until the time of his death in 1944. 
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agents In most European countries. However, due largely 
to Hitler's belief that Britain might yet be convinced not 
to oppose German moves, the Abwehr had not begun Operations 
in Ireland, The situation drastically changed when, in 
January 1939» the Irish Republican Army issued a "declar­
ation of war" against Great Britain. The Irish ultimatum, 
signed by Sean Russell,the I.R.A. Chief of Staff, warned 
that unless all Crown agencies and forces were immediately 
withdrawn from Northern Ireland, terrorist operations would 
begin in Britain itself. When the British government 
made no move to comply with the I.R.A. demands, sporadic 
bomb explosions were heard throughout England. 
The Abwehr office was not slow to discern an advan­
tageous situation. Regardless of the foreign office ban 
28 
on all intelligence activities in Ireland, Abwehr II, 
under the direction of Lt, Colonel Erwin Lahou8ln,29 
Sean Russell, Director of Munitions, I.R.A., 1921-
1922, pre-World War II Chief of Staff, and hence, the lead-
ing figure in the I.R.A, Died in 1940, while en route to 
Ireland from Germany, 
27 PoreiKn Polloy Reports. XXX, 1939, 279-280. 
p Q 
Abwehr II was primarily concerned with espionage 
activities and the maintenance of contacts with discontented 
minority elements in other countries, Stephan, 26. 
29 General Erwin Lahousen, chief of Abwehr II, 1939-
1943, Appeared as a prominent prosecution witness at the 
Nuremberg trials following World War II« Died in 1955° 
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prepared to dispatch its first agent to Ireland, The 
German agent, Oscar C. Pfaus, was to proceed to Ireland 
via the normal transportation routes and establish con= 
tacts with the I.E.A. If the I.E.A. proved agreeable, 
an Irish agent was to be sent to Berlin to begin formal 
discussions concerning possible German aid to the under­
ground army.30 
Pfaus arrived in Dublin on February 3, and immed­
iately sought out the only person in Ireland known to 
the Abwehr, General Eoin 0'Duffy of the Irish fascist 
Blue Shijyts. Although OfDuffy most certainly was not 
pleased with the prospect of aiding Pfaus .to establish 
contacts with the I.E.A., a group which he considered 
closely tied to the Bolsheviks, contacts were nonetbe™ 
less made. A short time after his arrival, Pfaus met 
with a number of the I.E.A.'s leading members, including 
the chief of staff, Sean Eussell. After he had received 
Eussell's willing agreement to send a representative to 
Berlin, Pfaus returned to Germany. He was destined to 
be the only Nazi agent sent to Ireland that succeeded in 
eluding capture by the Irish authorities. 
30 
^ Stephan, 27-31. 
31 
^ Ibid, 31. 
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Later In the monthr'the I.R.A. representative, James 
0'Donovan, arrived in Hamburg and sought out Pfiaus, who 
in turn sent him on to Captain Friedrich C. Marwede, the 
Director of Office I West In Abwehr II <, Lengthy discuss-
Ions between Marwede and 0"Donovan followed» During the 
talks the two men analyzed the I.R.A.'s role In the future 
conflict and the formation of links between the agents of 
the Abwehr and the I.R.A. Following the meeting, 0'Dono­
van returned to Ireland to place the German proposals 
before the I.R.A.'s military oounsel.^^ 
While oommunloatlons were thus being formed between 
Berlin and the underground army In Eire, the I.R.A.®s 
terrorist campaign In Britain oontlnued. At the begin­
ning of Maroh, elements of the I.R.A. planted bombs on 
aqueducts in the Grand Union Canal near London and the 
Birmingham Navigation Caiial near Straffordshlre.^^ Al« 
though neither attack suooeeded in destroying the ague-
duots, the threat of severe flooding no doubt raised the 
ire of many an Englishman, 
Although the I.R.A.'s terrorist aotlvities thus far 
had been oonflned to Great Britain, de Valera nonetheless 
moved to restrict the power of the republican army in 
Stephan, 38. 
33 Ibid. 
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Ireland, On Maroh 7, the Dall Elreann passed an Offenses 
Against the State Bill by a 78-12 margin and Introduced„ 
from the committee stage, the Treason Bill which called 
3li 
for the death penalty in cases of treason,^ 
Shortly after the legal restrictions against the 
I.E.A. were passed in Ireland, a second and much more 
threatening measure was taken in Britain. In the last 
week of April the Roman Catholic hierarchy of England 
and Wales officially threatened excommunication to any of 
its church members taking part in the terrorist campaign. 
The ohuroh hierarchy In Eire, however, refused to be drawn 
into the matter. Although the Irish church officials 
deplored the I.B.A.'s tactics, they nonetheless publicly 
approved of its Ideals. 
On April 26, James 0*Donovan made his second brief 
journey to Germany. Once again he and. the Abwehr officials 
discussed the possibility of forming more solid ties be-
tweenthe two, of sending German weapons to Elte and of 
furnishing the I.E.A. with a wireless set with which it 
oould remain in closer contact with Berlin. Although 
0"Donovan left without receiving definite assurances of 
German aid, he did reach an agreement by which a courier 
The Times (London), Maroh 8, 1939o 
35 Time, XXX, May 1, 1939, 55. 
83 
oommunioations system would be established with Berlin. 
In the meantime» the I.E.A, campaign continued. On 
May 30 the I.E.A. staged a massive demonstration in Bel­
fast against the British presence in Northern Ireland. 
The Belfast police department « as a result, was forced to 
call out all of its reserves and use armored cars to 
disperse the demonstrators» Less than two weeks later, 
on June 11, the Voelkisher Beobachter reported that "the 
most extensive to date of the Irish attaoks on English 
soil" had ooourred the previous night. Thirty bomb ez= 
plosions hal taken plaoe In post offices throughout 
England, seventeen of whioh occurred during a single two 
hour period In London, Birmingham aM Manchester. 
The Increased ferocity of the campaign caused both 
London and Dublin to take additional measures against the 
I.E.A. On June 23, the government of Eire declared that 
the Irish Eepubllcan Army,iunder the Offenses Against the 
State Bills was an unlawful organization and "one which 
ought In the public Interest to be suppressed. 
The most stringent measures against the I.E.A. were 
taken In the British House of Commons where, on July 24, 
Stephan, 40. 
^7 Ibid, 41. 
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Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare39 called for the passage 
of extraordinary measures to halt the terrorist campaign» 
In posing his case, Sir Samuel stated that 127 bomb ineld-
ents had oeourred since the previous January, with over 
fifty taking place in London alone. In addition, British 
police had uncovered an loB.A. plot (muoh in the spirit of 
Guy Pawkes) to blow up the houses of parliament* The most 
serious point, however, was that the campaign was "being 
olosely watched and actively stimulated by foreign organ­
izations.There could be little doubt as to which 
"foreign organizations" the Home Secretary referred. 
The British populace had only to wait two days for 
the I.E.A. rebuttal. R&publican bomb warfare, which 
had previously been conducted without the purposeful 
taking of human lives (only one death had occurred as a 
result of the previous 12? bomb incidents), now took a 
drastic turn. On July 26 the I.E.A. pertetrated two 
bomb outrages, "the brutality of which aroused great 
horror and did considerable damage to its reputation. 
Both bombs were placed in suitcases and left in the bag­
gage rooms of the King's Cross and Victoria stations. 
The explosions resulted in the death of one man at King's 
Sir Samuel Hoare, British wartime Home Secretary. 
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 
CCCL (1939), 1049. 
Stephan, 43-45. 
85 
Cross, and in severe injuries to five others at the Victoria 
station. The following night the I.E.A. made three further 
attacks in Liverpool, one of which caused the collapse of 
a bridge and halted barge traffic until the wreckage could 
42 be cleared. 
The I.RoAi, terrorist "war" reached its zenith during the 
last month of European peace. On August 25« a time bomb, 
hidden in the carrier basket of a bicycle, exploded in the 
busy Broadgate market street of Coventry, The explosion re­
sulted in the death of five people and left fifty others 
seriously wounded. The British authorities, armed with the 
Prevention of Violence Bill which had been passed as a re-
suit of Sir Samuel Hoare's speech, quickly arrested a number 
of suspects, two of whom, Peter Barnes and James Richards, 
were tried and convicted of murder. They were later sen= 
teneed to be hanged in February of the following year,^^ 
As the European war began, the I.E.A. continued its 
campaign of terror and violence in Great Britain, As a 
result, the British military and police personnel who 
stood guard at England's vital bridges, tunnels and commun-
icationncenters, did so not to protect against German 
attacks, but rather, against the attacks of Irish saboteurs, 
stephan, 43-45. 
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The British had good reason to fear the continued efforts 
of Irish saboteurs. Shortly after the beginning of the war. 
Colonel Lahousen's Abwehr II office had formulated plans 
calling for the use of both Irish and Welsh malcontents in 
Britain. The German plan, consisting of two general mea­
sures, called for the shipment of explosives to Irish and 
Welsh "sympathizers" in Britain, the purpose being to conduct 
sabotage attacks against British aircraft and munitions 
plants. The second part of the plan forsaw the shipment 
of explosive charges to neutral ports, such as Antwerp, 
where Irish and Welsh dockers omlLi tlben hjUie ttwrn aboard 
British and Commonwealth ships bound for Britain. The 
charges would then be set to explode while the ships were 
at sea. ^ 
While Lahousen was thus attempting to forge a work­
able espionage ring in Britain, the German foreign mln-
istry, with its usual pessimism, was taking a dim view of 
any and all efforts to take advantage of the Irish nation­
alist movement. In a message to the foreign office on 
October 14, Minister Bduard Hempel urged restraint in 
all dealings with the I.E.A. which, in his opinion, was 
"hardly strong enough for action with promise of success 
or Involving appreciable damage to England and is probably 
Charles Weighton and Gunter Pels, Hitler's Spies and 
Saboteurs„ (New York, 1958)» 209. Hereafter cited as Weighton 
and Pels. The work Is based on the war diaries of Lahousen. 
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also lacking In a leader of any stature. 
The Abwehr II office was not Inclined to agree oom= 
pletely with Hempel, although It too was growing rapidly 
disenchanted with the I.R.A. activities. By the winter 
of 19390 the I.R.A. campaign had sunk to the level of use­
less attacks upon "cinémas, telephone kiosks, letter 
boxes, and markets."^7 The I.R.A. might nonetheless prove 
to be a useful weapon in the German intelligence arsenal 
if It were placed under proper direction. As a result, 
the Abwehr II war diary noted, on November 28, that dis­
cus s ions had begun with the Naval Operations Division as 
to the possibility of landing an agent in Ireland by 
Ui-boat. The purpose of suoh a maneuver was to contact 
the I.R.A., with the idea of oonvlnclng it to follow more 
closely German direction.^® 
A month later the I.R.A. briefly awoke from its 
lethargy to achieve Its most spectacular success of the 
war, the "Christmas Raid" on the Irish Army's Phoenix Park 
Magazine Port in Dublin. The December 23 raid, which marked 
the beginning of I.R.A. activities in Eire itself, was 
46 
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completely JDloodless In charaeter. The I,R„A„ raiding 
party, consisting of 150 men in thirteen lorries, succeeded 
in easily overpowering the regular army guards at the fort, 
and made off with no less than 1,080,000 rounds of ammun­
ition and numerous weapons,The effects of the raid 
were immediate, and were felt as far away as Berlin. 
The I.a.A., which had in the interim finally obtained 
a transmitter, immediately radioed the Abwehr office to 
Inform it of their success. Kurt Haller, a section leader 
in Abwehr II. noted in the organizations's war diary that, 
although the German intelligence service would, have pre­
ferred that suoh efforts were directed against the British 
rather than the Irish, "nevertheless, as a result of the 
raid the opinion gained strength that despite its weak-
ness the I.E.A. was an element to be taken seriously.^^ 
The German determination to send an Abwehr agent into 
Eire was thus strengthened by the I.E.A. coup. The need 
to reestablish communications between the I.E.A. and Ber= 
lln provided yet another incentive for the plan. The I.E.A. 
transmitter, which for a number of weeks had been sending 
largely irrevelant reports to Berlin, was seized by the 
Irish police before the end Of the year. The Abwehr 
agent, Ernst Weber-Drohl, was therefore charged with the 
Time, XXXV, January 15, 194-0, 27. 
Stephan, 68. 
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task of delivering another wireless transmitter to its 
allies in Eire, In addition, the Abwehr instructed Weber-
Drohl to deliver $15,000 to help finance I.E.A. efforts, 
to arrange for the sending of another I.R.A, representative 
to Germany, and to attempt to convince the I.R.A. executive 
counsel to "limit themselves to important objectives and 
avoid wasted effort, 
On January 28, 1940, the U~37 departed from Wilhelm-
8haven with Meber-Drohl and his equipment aboard. Less 
than three weeks later, on February 15» Abwehr II received 
word that the agent had been safely landed in Ireland. 
The valuable radio equipment was, however, lost when the 
boat taking Weber-Drohl from the submarine to shore over­
turned. After landings, the agent immediately sought out 
James 0'Donovan, who in turn placed him in contact with 
the I.R.A. executive and provided a hideout for the vis­
itor. On March 27, the Abwehr II war diary noted that 
messages from Hempel indicated that the agent had succeeded 
in making contact with the I.R.A.^^ 
Unfortunately, the success of the German agent proved 
to be short-lived. A short time after he made contact 
with the I.R.A., Irish secret police arrested Weber-Drohl. 
the ensuing trial, which took place on April 24, proved to 
51 stephaa, 75-76. 
Ibid. 
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be an excellent example of the laxness in the Irish jud­
icial system during the early stages of the war. Although 
clearly a violator of the Aliens Act, Weber-Drohl received 
only a £3 fine fdr his offense. After being detained for 
a short time by the secret police, the German agent gained 
his freedom,53 
In the Interim, the Irish government had moved to 
curb the power of its own "fifth column," the I,R,A, On 
January 5» the Dail debated and passed the Emergency Powers 
Bill. The bill gave the government the extraordinary power 
to intern without trial all citizens suspected of treason. 
As a result, Irish jails quickly became filled with over 
600 I.E.A. suspects. 
Although the I.R.A, bomb campaign was severely re­
stricted by increased security measures in both Great Britain 
and Ireland, it nonetheless made one final effort on the 
British mainland. In mid-February, Peter Barnes and James 
Richards, convicted of murder in connection with the 
Coventry raid of the previous August, were hanged in Lon­
don, While the British populace viewed the pair as wanton 
murderers, in Ireland they immediately became martyrs in 
Stèphan, 82-85, 
The Times (London), January 5» 19^0, and Bromage, 
276. 
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the cause of Irish freedom and unity. As a conse­
quence „ numerous I.E.A. bomb explosions occurred through­
out Britain. The most serious explosion was reported 
in Liverpool, where the new Belfast steamer, the 8.5, 
Munster, sank after a bomb exploded on board as it en-
tered the harbor. 
The February attacks proved to be the last success­
ful efforts of the I.R.A, in Britain. British wartime 
security, plus the mass arrests and deportation of sus­
pect Irishmen, quickly brought a halt to the terrorist 
campaign. The I.E.A. thereafter confined Itself to 
operations In Northern and Southern Ireland. James 
0^Donovan, who not only had served as the I.E.A. repre­
sentative In Berlin, but also had trained youthful I.R.A. 
bomb-throwers and drawn up the plans for the English OEua--
palgn, was quite critical of the I.R.A. "war" In Great 
Britain. 0^Donovan stated that because the I.E.A. had 
not waited for substantial German aid or the occurrence 
an event such as Dubklrk, the campaign had "brought nothing 
but harm to Ireland and the I.R.A. 
The I.E.A., nonetheless, continued Its efforts In 
Ireland, In February, elements of the I.E.A. attacked the 
Time, XXXV, February 19» 19^0, 26-27, and Bromage, 
275-276. 
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British military depot at Ballyklnlar in County Down, 
Northern Ireland. After overpowering the guards, the repub­
licans raided the arsenal, and seized over 200 rifles and 
assorted ammunition. De Valera, who was himself an I.E.A, 
veteran, angrily denounced the nationalist activities on 
both-sides of the border, "Instead of being patriots," he 
stated, "they (are) behaving as nothing but traitors."57 
The end of the I.E.A. campaign In Britain concluded 
the first phase In Germany's attempts, operating in con­
junction with the I.E.A., to establish an intelligence-
espionage network In Ireland, The second phase, which 
continued for approximately one year, until June, 1941, 
was marked by the frenzied efforts of the German Abwehr 
to bring some direction to the I.R.A.'s rather haphazard 
activities in Ireland, To accomplish this task, the 
Abwehr employed a number of agents in Eire, the most 
Important being the tragl-oomic figure of Captain Dr, 
Hermann Goertz. 
Captain Goertz, like most of his compatriots sent 
Into Eire, had little or no knowledge of Ireland or Irish 
affairs. Indeed, his primary recommendation for the 
Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, VII, 
"The War and the Neutrals," (London, 1956),239-240. Here= 
after cited as Survey, 
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mission seemed to lie in a previous arrest for spying in 
Britain, Nonetheless, in May 1940, Abwehr II found it­
self in dire need of establishing a reliable agent In 
<8 
Eire, and Goertz was chosen, 
Goertz, who received his orders directly from Admiral 
Canaris, later explained to the Irish secret police that 
he had had a threefold mission in Eire. Goertz was to 
support, whenever possible, those elements in Ireland 
which sought the maintenance of Irish neutrality and 
hence the denial of Irish harbors to the British, Such 
a situation was viewed by the German navy as "very sat­
isfactory and „ <, , entirely in our interests that there 
should be no change in this position."^9 
Secondly, Abwehr II Instructed Goertz to exploit 
and direct the efforts of the "national revolutionary 
group" in its activities against the British enemy, Flna 
lly ,, as the Abwehr II agent stated, "I was to try to stir 
up a partisan war in Ulster,"^® Admiral Canaris forwarned 
Goertz that, in fulfilling his mission, the agent could 
utilize only the intelligence resources to be found in 
Eire, Believing the I.E.A. to be well armed after the 
58 Stephan, BBff, 
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raid on Phoenix Park, Abwehr II informed Goertz that 
German weapons and advisors would be forthcoming only 
after a general revolutionary movement, directed against 
the British in Northern Ireland, seemed eminent. 
By the first week of May the German intelligence 
department had come to the decision that Operation Malnan, 
the code name of Goertz's mission, could begin. Conse­
quently, on May 7» the Abwehr agent parachuted into Eire. 
After several days of hiking, during whlc time he had 
neither food nor shelter, Goertz came to the first of his 
prearranged contacts, Goertz's contact, a Mrs. Stuart* 
was the wife of an Irish author who at the time was serving 
as an advisor on Irish affairs in Berlin. After some time 
Goertz met with James 0'Donovan, who took the German agent 
to his own home in Shankill, a suberb of Dublin. During 
his three day stay at Shanklll, Goertz met several members 
of the I.E.A. ezeoutlve oounoll, Inoludlng the new chief 
of staff, Sephan Hayes. 
Stephan, 98-99. The Abwehr office was apparently 
not aware that three-fourths of the booty from the raid., 
or 800,000 rounds of ammunition, had been recovered by 
the Irish police. 
Francis Stuart, the husband of Goertz's contact, 
was an Irish author of some note who, during World War II, 
served as a lecturer on Irish literature at Berlin Univer­
sity, an advisor on Irish affairs, and made several broad­
casts to his countrymen from Germany. 
^3 stephan, 99» Stephan Hayes became chief of staff 
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Following his stay in Shankill, Goertz moved to 
his permanent hideout in Eire, the home of Stephan 
Carroll Held, The Irishman was no stranger to either 
Goertz or the Abwehr office. During the previous month, 
Held had visited Berlin as the representative of the 
I.E.A. In addition to the usual requests for weapons 
and financial aid. Held had also brought with him Plan 
Kathleen (known in Germany as the Artus Plan), the pro­
posed invasion of Northern Ireland, Unfortunately, the 
I.R,A,-sponsored plan proved to be childishly unfeasable, 
as a result, the General Staff immediately disavowed 
any possibility that it might be carried out success-
fully. 
During the two months that he stayed at the Held 
residence, the Villa Eonstanz on Tèmpleogue Epad, Dublin, 
Goertz conducted several meetings with Hayes and other 
I.E.A. officers. At each meeting the Abwehr agent attempt­
ed to convince the I.E.A. to abandon its fratracidal war 
against de Valera's government in Eire, and turn Instead 
to the more Important task of expelling the British from 
Ulster. The I.E.A. leadership, however, proved unable to 
control its own forces, and the useless, sporadic fighting 
64 
continued. 
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Striking without warning, on May 23» elements of the 
Irish secret police converged, en masse, upon the Villa 
Konstanz, Captain Goertz, who had been warned by his host, 
managed to escape, but Held and one other suspect were 
taken into custody. Among the tlems found by police at 
the Villa, were an opened German parachute, a Luftwaffe 
cap, German uniform Inslgnlas, German World War I decor­
ations, a radio transmitter, detailed maps of Irish bridges, 
harbors and airfields, a box containing $20,000 in U.S. 
currency, and Plan Kathleen,The repercussions from the 
raid, needless to say, were quick in coming. 
Prime Minister de Valera, in a torrent of righteous 
wrath reserved normally for the British, denounced both 
Germany and the I.E.A. for their roles in the affairs 
It took 600 years to get Britain out of this 
country. We don't want them or any others to 
oome in here again . , . Unfortunately there is 
a small group that appears to be meditating trea-
son. I tell them . . . that such a state of 
affairs will not be tolerated."' 
On May 24, Minister Hempel informed the foreign min­
istry about the Villa Konstanz raid. Hempel, who had no 
knowledge that German agents were operating in Eire, 
remained Incredulous that Brandy (the name given Goertz 
by Held) was indeed an Abwehr agent. In fact, Hempel 
Time. XXXV, June 3, 1940, 39. 
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believed the affair to be hothlrsg less than a British 
plot. The so-called Brandy was not a German agent, 
stated Hempel, but was In fact a British agent. Hempel 
believed that Bi^a^d.y'had gained the confidence of the 
unwary Held In an effort to embarass the German Legation 
In Dublin "in order to destroy Irish neutrality," The 
raid on the Villa was, in short, "an act of agression 
. . . against me and Held. 
While the foreign office busily sought to smooth 
the ruffled feelings of the Irish Prime Minister, 
Abwehr II resignedly discarded Operation Malnau as a 
failure. The Abwehr II war diary hoted that, although 
Goertz had escaped capture, he could be of ho further 
use. "Even if he is not captured in the near future," 
the entry read, "his further activity is rendered im­
possible in consequence I of > the( dtS0Ov®yy' of the trans­
mitter and money."^9 
On June 1, Hempel finally received notification 
from the Director of the Political Department of the 
Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Woermann, that Goertz (Brandy) 
was Indeed a German agent. Hempel was therefore con­
fronted with the difficult task of trying to restore 
de Valera's confidence, which, to quote the minister, 
D.G.P.P. IX, Doo. No. 314, 431. 
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"has been shattered" by the Held oase.?^ Six weeks 
after the arrest of Held, the foreign office still had 
made little progress in restoring friendly relations* 
In desperationJ Ribbentrop rather falsely informed the 
Irish government, on July 11, that it was "an utterly 
unreasonable suspicion that we might have the Intention 
to prepare to use Ireland as a military base against 
England through a so-called 'fifth column', which besides 
does not exist. 
Shortly after the arrest of Held, the foreign office 
requested that the Abwehr department momentarily cease 
operations in Ireland. However, Abwehr I ̂.ehose to dis­
regard the pleas of the Wilhelmstrasse, and continued in 
its efforts to establish a network in Eire. 
In June, Abwehr I » in charge of operational recon-
sent two more agents into Eire, The two agents, 
Walter Simon and Willy Preetz, were to land by submarine 
at different times in Dingle Bay on the western coast of 
Ireland. Both agents received identical assignments. 
They were to transmit the movements of British convoys 
for use by Admiral Doenitz's submarine command, and were to 
send urgently needed daily weather reports for use by the 
Luftwaffe. Abwehr I ordered that they avoid all contact 
D.G.F.P.. X, Doc. No. 79, 89. 
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with the I.R.A.72 
Willy Preetz, whose passport bore the name Paddy Mitch­
ell, landed at Dingle Bay In the beginning of June. After 
reaching Dublin, Preetz established himself In a shop by the 
harbor area and proceeded to send dally reports to Berlin, 
For several weeks the agent operated with little diffienlty. 
Eventually, however» his neighbors became suspicious,, and as a 
consequence, Irish police promptly arrested the agent. 
Walter Simon, whose cover name was Karl Anderson» had 
even less fortune than Preetz, Landing In Dingle Bay on the 
night of June 12, he made his way to Tralee where he hoped 
to board a train for Dublin. Unfortunately, Irish deteô-
ttm^were also at the railway station, and on the morning 
following his arrival In Ireland, Simon found himself In an 
Irish jail, A jury later found the German agent guilty of 
Illegal entrance Into the country, and sentenced him to 
three years' imprisonment.?^ 
In July, 1940, Abwehr II transferred all espionage 
activities from France to Britain. In connection with 
the increased emphasis on Great Britain, Abwehr II sent 
three more agents Into Ireland. During the first week 
of July, three agents, Dieter Gaertner and Herbert Trlbuth 
72 stephan, 138-139. 
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of South Africa, and Henry Obed of India, arrived via 
cutter in Baltimore Bay on the southern coast of Eire,, 
The Abwehr office had instructed the three men to separate 
upon landing and individually find tmansportat&on to Brit­
ain, where they were to carry out espionage activities. 
The two Germans and one very dark-skinned Indian 
quickly aroused 8uspj.clazi among the local inhabitants. 
As a result, Irish police immediately arrested the agents» 
When the police searched the three men they found eight In­
cendiary bombs, four tins of explosives and £850 In Bank of 
England notes, all of which prompted the Special Criminal 
Court, on August 17» to sentence the agents to seven years" 
penal servitude.7^ 
Due to the Abwehr's disillusionment with he I.E.A., 
all agents sent to Ireland after the arrest of Held had 
been Instructed to avoid contact with the underground army. 
The I.a.A. nonetheless remained a force which, if brought 
under effective control, could be of inestimable value In 
the struggle against Britain. As a result, Abwehr II made 
one final effort to exploit the situation. 
At the end of January, 1940, the German consul-general 
at Genoa received word that Sean Russell, the I.R.A.'s ex-
chief of staff, would shortly arrive from the United States. 
75 stephan, 150. 
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Bassell, through his envoy John McCarthy, made It known 
that, if Germany were prepared to do so, he desired to 
return to Ireland aboard a German submarine.^7 The Abwehr 
proved more than willing to provide the necessary trans-
portation. 
An immense opportunity presented itself in such a 
mission. Although Russell, because of his absense the 
previous year, had lost much of his former influence, he 
nevertheless was one of the few men who could weld the I.E.A. 
into an effective force. Abwehr II therefore took an imm= 
ediate interest in the Irishman. 
The primary weakness of all bureaucratic systems, 
duplication of purpose and procedure, became manifest 
during the four month period of negotiations which followed. 
It soon became evident that thé Abwehr was not the only 
department interested in Sean Bussell. The foreign min= 
istry had also seen the importance of the I.E.A.'s ez-
chief of staff, and had agreed with the Abwehr"s esti­
mation of Rusêll's value. However, the always cautious 
Wllhelmstrasse feared tlœ reaction from Dublin if Germany 
landed Russell in neutral Eire. Consequently, Rlbbentrop 
demanded that his office be allowed to take a hand in the 
matter, and that restraint be taken in all operations 
D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 562, 693. 
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Involving the Irièh nationalist.?^ Whan Russel arrived in 
Genoa he was therefore met by two representatives of Hitler's 
German, Dr. Franz Promme of Abwehr II and Dr. Edmund Veesen-
mayer of the forelng office. 
On July 13» a second event of good fortune occurred 
for the Abwehr. Admiral Canaris, through personal contacts 
with the chief of the Spanish secret police, secured the 
release of Prank Ryan who had spent the previous two years 
in Spanish jails.^9 
The acquisition of Ryan's release proved to be of 
at least equal value to the plans involving Russell„ Due 
to his role in the Spanish Civivl War, Ryan had gained 
the sympathy arid respect of Irishmen from all walks of 
life, including de Valera who had personally written Gen-
eràl Pranclsco Franco in an effort to secure a parden for 
RO 
the Irish patriot. Germany could therefore obtain a 
diplomatic,"as well as intelligence, coup by successfully 
landing Russell and Ryan in Eire. 
Operation Dove, the return of Russell land Ryan to 
Ireland, began in earnest on August 8, 1940. Russell, 
the leader of the two-man team, had not been previously 
given specific instructions as to his mission. The Abwehr 
78 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doo. No. 605, 760. 
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and foreign office no doubt believed', that any move the 
two men took In relation to the Irish nationalist move­
ment would be of value to Germany. The Abwehr simply 
informed Russell that future Instructions would be passed 
81 
on to him by a prearranged signal. However, General 
Lahousen later contradicted the nonchalance of the Abwehr 
planners. In an Interview with newsmen following the war, 
he stated that Abwehr II's plans for Russell actually 
Included the organization of an uprising in Ireland timed 
to coincide with Operation Sealion, and the establishment 
O p  
of a base of sabotage operations in that country. 
Whatever the instructions might have been, they were 
to no avail, for neither man was destined to return to 
Ireland, On August 14 Sean Russell, who had suffered 
from an unknown Illness slnoe the beginning of the voy­
age, died from what was later surmised to be a burst 
gastric ulser. His body was wrapped in a German war 
ensign and burled at sea, 100 miles west of Galway, Ire-
land.83 
Frank Ryan, who had no knowledge of any operational 
instructions for the mission, returned to Germany, Ryan 
hoped that the German authorities would organize a second, 
similar mission. The foreign office and Abwehr were, 
81 Stephan, iB^ff, 
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however, faced with the task of finding an explanation 
for Russell's rather mysterious death. As a result, 
OperàtÈon Dwe was not attempted again. Ryan remained 
In Germany, where he became an unofficial advisor on 
Irish affairs. On June 10, 1944, he died in Dresden 
after a six month Illness. 
The death of Russell, and the subsequent cancell­
ation of Operation Dove, caused a lapse In the Abwehr"s 
attempts to infiltrate agents into Eire. It was not, 
in fact, until the following year that another Abwehr 
agent landed in Ireland. 
On March 12, 1941, Gunther Schuetz parachuted over 
what he though was Newbridge, a olty located fifteen 
miles west of Dublin (due to pilot error he was actually 
sixty miles from his intended landing place). Schuetz 
brought with him to Ireland a radio transmitter, on which 
he intended to make dally reports to the Abwehr on weather 
conditions, convoy movements, and economic production in 
Northern Ireland. However, Schuetz never had the oppor­
tunity to use the transmitter. Barely twelve hours after 
hi8..landing, Irish police arrested the German agent. 
Stephan, 28^. 
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The Ignoble failure of Sehuetz's mission proved to 
be the final lesson needed to convince the Abwehr of the 
futility of such operations». As a result, the intelligence 
service refrained from sending German agents into Ireland 
for the duration of the war. 
The Schuetz mission ended the second phase in the oper­
ations of the German intelligence In Ireland. The third and 
final phaset lasting from 1941 to 19^5» was marked by the 
formation of Irish and German military units for use in Ire­
land, and the continued efforts of Captain Goertz to bring 
cohesion to the I.E.A. campaign. 
Following his narrow escape from capture during the 
raid on Held*8 Villa Eonstanz, Goertz resolved never again 
to aooept I.a.A. "protection." As a result, during the re-
mainder of the time he continued at liberty, Goertz created 
his own system of hideouts. From his various bases, the 
agent could conduct his operations without fear of investi­
gation by the Irish secret police which continued its raids 
on known I.R.A. meeting places. 
Primarily because the Irish authorities had discovered 
his presence in Ireland, Goertz concluded that his original 
assignment had changed. He how was faced with two major 
^^Stephan, 130. The following is taken from Goertz's 
testimony to the Irish secret police and articles which he 
wrote following the war, cited In Stephan's work. 
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concerns, "to learn as much as possible about the true sit­
uation in Ireland," and to forward that information to the 
87 
Abwehr in German. 
The first of Goertz's self-assigned missions proved the 
least difficult to accomplish. Through his contacts with 
the I.E.A, executive, as well as numerous friends in all 
walks of life in Eire, the agent succeeded in remaining 
abreast of all new developments in Ireland. However, the 
forwarding of this information to Germany proved to be a much 
more difficult task. Because his radio transmitter had been 
confiscated during the raid on Held's villa, Goertz was 
forced to relyiupon a number of communication methods. At 
various times the German agent attempted to smuggle messages 
out of Ireland via neutral seamen, by Falangist couriers from 
Spain, by sending a message over the German Legation wireless, 
and, on several occasions when the information appeared to be 
vital, Goertz attempted to deliver the message personally by 
leaving Ireland in rnumerous and assorted types of craft. 
None of the methods proved acceptableThey were either too 
slow, extremely dangerous, untrustworthy, or failed completely. 
The most obvious means of communications was via I.E.A. 
transmitter, but Goertz found the idea to be even more un-
Stephan, 178=179. 
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acceptable than the others. To use the I.E.A. facilities, 
which were quite poor, would hâve required the subsequent 
use of the I.E.A. intelligence system* which Goertz described 
as being "as primitive as that of children playing cops and 
robbers. 
The I.E.A. nevertheless proved to be of value. In 
late springs shortly before Schuetz's abortive mission, 
Goettz received a wireless set and an operator from the 
underground army. To Goertz, the receipt of the radio 
and operator was "the only valuable help which I re­
ceived from the I.E.A.The German could thus send 
regular reports to his superiors in Berlin, In several 
cases those reports were believed to have concerned mil­
itary intelligence gathered by the I.E.A. in Northern 
Ireland, 
In addition to his other duties, Goertz also contin­
ued in his thankless attempts to convince the I.E.A. 
leadership that they were accomplishing nothing by their 
useless campaigns. On one occasion, when the chief of 
staff, Stephan Hayes, boasted that 5,000 Irishmen were 
active members of the I.E.A., Goertz lost what little 
patience remained to him, Stat&ng that with _$00 discip­
lined troops he could successfully march on Belfast, he 
Stephan, I96, 
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exclaimed that by such action "these relatively few men 
would have done more for Ireland than five thousand 
talkers who argued about the legality of the second and 
third Dall."91 
Goertz's spirit rose when, in November, 1941, an 
incident occurred which could well have proven to be the 
agent's most valuable contribution to the German war 
effort. During the first weeks of the month Goertz was 
contacted by officers of the Regular Irish Army. Follow-
Ing months of futile conversations with the loR.A., Goertz 
found, much to his pleasure, that the officers completely 
concurred with his estimation of the Irish situation. 
Furthermore, the Irish army officers Informed the agent 
that they were prepared to confront de Valera and his 
government with definite proposals regarding the accept-
ance of German aid In alleviating the border problem. 
The German agent, who had not been empowered to make 
definite proposals or agreements of German aid, would in 
the Interim contact his superiors to place before them 
the Irish plans. The two parties agreed that Goertz should 
travel, via Irish army plane, to the German headquarters 
in France and there seek aid for the project. 
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Unknown to Goertz, other German representatives 
in Eire had also been contacted by elements of the Irish 
military. The Counselor of the German Legation, Henning 
Thornsen, had carried on several conversations with a 
"well known Irish officer," who was prepared to declare 
93 
himself In favor of German-Irish military collaboration. 
In addition. Minister Hempel had also reported earlier 
in the year that he had had conversations with a high 
ranking officer who, for security reasons, was referred 
to as "L"o As in the previous eases, the officer informed 
Hempel of the attitudes and personalities then prevalent 
in the military and government,On all three occasions, 
the German representatives refused to divulge the identity 
of the Irish pffleers. 
However, the contacts with sympathizers in the Irish 
military never became delveloped. On November 23, elements 
of the Irish secret police, while In the process of raiding 
a suspected I„R,A„ meeting place Blackheath Park, Dublin, 
paused to investigate an adjoining house. Inside they 
found, and arrested, Hermann Goertz,^^ 
Goertz had succeeded In remaining at liberty In Eire 
for nineteen months, longer by far than any of his fellow 
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agents. There are three possible reasons for his 
success. The first, and most likely. Is that the Irish 
secret police simply failed to find him. Secondly> the 
possibility exists that the secret police knew of his 
whereabouts during the entire period, and allowed him 
to remain free so that they could legally arrest all 
I.R.Ao suspects that came in contact with him. Finally, 
the de Valera government may have allowed Goertz to 
remain at liberty for use as a possible liaison in the 
event that Germany appeared on the verge of winning the 
war,In connection with the last two points, one may 
also surmise that Goertz's freedom became too much of a 
threat when he was contacted by elements of the Irish 
army—elements that supposedly represented the govern­
ment and its policies. Whatever the reason, It Is an 
undeniable fact that during the long period of his service, 
Goertz provided the Abwehr with its only reliable source 
of information In Ireland, 
During the same period that Goertz operated In Eire, 
Abwehr and foreign office officials continued to seek ways 
in which the situation in Ireland could be used to advan­
tage, One such plan was Operation Osprey. 
Stephen, 2^0, 
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Operation Osprey Involved the landing of a para­
military force in Ireland, Because the program remained 
in various stages of preparation for a period of two 
years, It quite frequently changed in character and 
outlook. As originally proposed, shortly after the fall 
of Prance„ the operation called for the recruitment of 
a brigade from among Irish prisoners of war. The mission 
of such a force involved sabotage operations in Britain 
and Northern Ireland, or, in the event of an Anglo-
American invaison of Eire, the organization of guerilla 
97 
operations in Southern Ireland. 
In the spring "of 1941 a special camp for Irish 
p.o.w.*8 was established at Frlesack, Germany. Three 
men, Helmut Clissman and Dr. Jupp Hoven of Abwehr II, 
and Frank Byan, began the arduous assignment of selecting 
volunteers. However, they met with even less success 
than their World War I predecessor. Sir Roger Casement. 
By the following year the three men had selected a 
"Brigade" of ten Irishmen, The twenty-four months of 
preparation for the mission came to nothing when, shortly 
after the foroe began actual training, the foreign office 
and Abwehr department decided to abandon the project. The 
maintenance of Eire's neutrality was found to be more im-
9? Stephan. 235=237. 
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portant than: the landing of a small force of saboteurs, 
which might in some way upset the Irish political equil­
ibrium. 
A second, and less extravagant, proposal for Operation 
Dsprey was made in August, 1941, when It appeared that a 
British attack on Eire might be eminent. The second plan 
called for the infiltration into Eire of a three-man mission„ 
made up of Ryan, Clissmann and Bruno Eleger, a radio oper-
ator. The three men were to act as a military "listening 
post," to gather and send back to Germany information on 
British operations during the invasion. When the British 
attack failed to materialize, the Abwehr cancelled the plan,99 
The most ambitious proposal for Operation Osprey 
was made at the beginning of 1942. Walter Schellenberg, 
Director of Office VI of the Reich Security Headquarters, 
pa^posed that in the event of an Anglo-American occupation 
of Ireland, the Abwehr department be relieved of all but 
technical responsibility for Osprey. In its place, the 
foreign office and 8.8. were to carry out all necessary 
arrangements.The Schellenberg Plan, as this phase 
of Operation Osprey became known, called for the form­
ation of an independent force, the No. 1 8*8, Special 
Service Troop. The 8.8. force, armed with armor-piercing 
99 Stephan, 221-223. 
100 Ibid. 234-235. 
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weapons, was to be divided Into small detachments and 
sent into Eire to work among the I.E.A. and partisan 
forces which chose to resist the occupation. The 
Special Service Troop, which eventually numbered 100 
volunteers, received its training at the Totenkamph 
(Death's Head) Barracks in Berlin, Helmut Clissmann 
once again became part of the operation, being placed 
In charge of training the troop In the use of British 
weapons and in sabotage operations. Unfortunately, 
the training provided by Clissmann was once again wasted. 
When it became apparent that no Anglo-Amerloan foroe would 
invade Eire, this, the final proposal for Operation Osprey, 
was also discarded. 
In the years of war remaining, only two intelligence 
missions occurred which involved either Ireland or Irish 
nationals. In midsummer, 1942, General Lahousen approved 
a plan by which an agent would be dropped by parachute 
Into Great Britain. The agent, an Irishman whose name 
remains unknown, received intensive training in indus­
trial sabotage at the Abwehr training center in Berlin. 
His mission Involved the perpetration of sabotage attacks 
upon British aircraft industries, aluminium works and 
hydro-electric installations in the Glascow area. Al­
though he successfully parachuted over Scotland, it is 
101 Stephan, 234-235. 
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1 02  not known whether his mission met with success or failure. 
The final attempt by the Abwehr to send men Into Eire 
occurred In 1943, In December of that year two Irishmen, 
John Kenny and John O'Heilly, parachuted Into Ireland. They 
were to transmit Information back to Berlin concerning the 
Anglo-American military bulld-up prior to the Normandy 
Invasion, As was the ease with their German predecessors, 
1 0? both men were immediately captured by the Irish police. 
The eight German agents sent into Ireland after the 
beginning of hostilities spent the remainder of World War 
II in Athlone Prison Camp. On September 10, 1946, they 
were contacted by a member of the Irish Ministry of Justice 
and given the choice of returning to Germany or receiving 
asylum In Eire. Seven of the eight agents chose to remain 
In Ireland* only Walter Simon, alias Karl Anderson, re­
turned to Germany. 
During the following months the ex-agents succeeded 
in establishing a degree of personal life and security 
In Ireland,However, in April, 194?, the western 
102 Welghton and Pèls, 279. 
103 Stephan, 278-279. 
Ibid, 290ff. 
Ibid. Hermann Goertz, in February, 1947, became sec­
retary of an Irish relief organization for German children, 
and the remainder of the Germans either established them-
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allies demanded the return of the seven to Germany for 
Interrogation purposes„ De Valera, who was at that time 
attempting to reestablish the diplomatic life of Eire, 
complied with the allied request. All the agents, except 
Goertz, consequently returned to Germany. Goertz, for 
reasons known only to himself, chose suicide Instead. 
There Is an old Gaelic slogan and war cry which pro-
claims that "England's difficulty Is Ireland's opportunity!" 
The German Abwehr and the Irish nationalists might well have 
employed that slogan during World War II to gain their Indi­
vidual objectives. However, both failed to grasp the Initia­
tive In what was an extremely advantageous clrcumstahoe. 
The history of the German attempt to gain a footing 
In Ireland Is marked by a singular lack of success. Few, 
If any, of the Abwehr agents sent to Ireland had any knowl­
edge of the land or people. Individually, the German 
agents no doubt were Intelligent, competant men. However, 
even the most Intelligent man will fall when he Is faced 
with a situation that is completely alien to him. 
selves in business or found jobs. The most successful of 
the group proved to be Gunther Schuetz who started an 
extremely profitable business dealing, ironically, in surplus 
British war materials. 
Stephan, 290ff. 
116 
The poor preparation of the Abwehr agents was not 
the only cause for the mlsearriage of Germany's intelli­
gence designs in Ireland. There existed in the Third 
Reieh a basic dichotomy of interest that served to sub­
vert the best laid plans of Berlin, The Abwehr viewed 
Ireland and the I.E.A. as simply a medium through which 
it could conduct intelligence, espionage and sabotage 
missions against Britain. However, the foreign office 
regarded Ireland in an entrlely different light. To 
the Wllhelmstrasse, Irish neutrality was not only an 
accepted fact. It was also highly desirable. Therefore, 
Rlbbentrop's foreign office cautioned restraint whenever 
It was In a position to ezert Its Ihfluence. 
If Germany somehow had managed to correct its own 
Internal problems. Its efforts in Ireland would. In all 
probability, still have failed. To achieve success In 
Ireland, the Abwehr needed the complete and active support 
of the Irish Bepubllcan Army. At no time during the war 
did the Abwehr have that support. 
By 1939 the I.E.A, had disintegrated Into a mere 
shadow of the organization that had literally torn Ireland 
from the grasp of Britain following World War I. Disunited, 
largely purposeless, and without proper leadership, the 
I.E.A. cou^i do little to he^p Itself without the additional 
burden of helping someone else. Hermann Goertz best summer-
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Ized the utter frustration felt by all those Germans 
who attempted to bring cohesion to the I.R.A. when, in 
1941, he told. Stephan Hayes' alde-de-oamp: 
You (the loRoA.) know how to die for Ireland, 
but how to fight for It you have not the 
slightest Ideat^O? 
Stephan, I96, 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROPOSED GERMAN INVASION OF EIRE 
Throughout World War II, Nazi German chose to utilize 
Eire In a rather oblique fashion. The previous chapters have 
dealt, with Germany's "indirect" use of Ireland through diplo­
matic channels, with Doenltz's use of a neutral Ireland to 
strike at Britain's convoy routes, and with the Abwehr°s use 
of Eire to conduct operations against the British in Northern 
Ireland and Britain. However, there is yet one final direct, 
or active, means by which Ireland entered into Nazi strategy 
during the Second World War—the proposed German invasion of 
Southern Ireland. 
The concept of invading Ireland as a means of striking 
at Britain did not originate in the mind of Hitler or his 
strategists. As In the previous cases of Berlin's relations 
with Eire, Nazi Germany simply carried on, or borrowed from, 
well established precedents. Indeed, attempts by various 
European powers to invade Ireland had periodically occurred 
since the sixteenth century. 
The first of the more prominent invasion attempts, dis­
counting the largely Ineffective sojourns of the Vikings, 
occurred in 158O by Phillip II of Spain. Phillip estab­
lished during his invasion, a number of precedents which 
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were to appear in all the succeeding attempts. For one, 
the invasion was timed to coincide with a rebellion of the 
native Irish against their British overlords. The various 
invasion attempts which followed also took place at a time 
when the Irish were actively rebelling, or when a signifi­
cant portion was prepared to rebel. 
Secondly, the Spanish commanders found, much to their 
chagrin no doubt, that they could not rely upon the support 
of the Irish rebels. The independent Irishmen, were loath 
to accept orders of their "liberators," be they Spanish, 
French, German, or whoever. Closely coordinated campaigns 
were therefore out of the question. In addition, once the 
rebellion had begun and the European troops landed, the 
Irish exhibited a ludicrous desire and capacity for fighting 
amongst themselves rather than against their British enemy. 
Every rebellion in Ireland, including the successful 1916= 
1921 rebellion, ended in a struggle involving Irishmen 
against Irishmen, rather than Irishmen against Englishemn. 
Such a situation was hardly conducive to a workable co­
hesion between the European powers and their Irish allies.^ 
^ During the period crowned by the efforts of Phillip II 
and the Tudors, Irish internal strife normally involved 
clan warfare, wherein one or moré,ôlan6,'8UGb as the O'Neill 
or the O'Donnell clans, would attempt to gain hegemony over 
all others. Since that time, such wars have taken on a 
religious tendency. Catholic vs. Protestant. 
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The most Important precedent set by Phillip II was 
failure» A short time after the Spanish landed in Ireland, 
the British surrounded the invaders in an Irish castle. 
The debacle whioh followed resulted in the death of sev-
enty-five percent of the force and imprisonment for the 
2 remainder. Although hardly a happy precedent, it was 
nonetheless one which would be inflexibly followed by all 
Phillip's followers. 
The most energetio efforts made toward invading Ire­
land took plaoe during the period of the French Eevo=, 
lutlon and the Napoleonic Empire. In April 1796, the 
Directory proposed invading Ireland with a large-scale 
force of 20,000 troops. Unfortunately, the plan remained 
In abeyance until. In 1798, rebellion erupted in Ireland. 
The Directory immediately proposed that the original 
invasion force be sent to support the rebels. Once again, 
the mission met with difficulty. Napoleon's Egyptian 
campaign at that time absorbed the Interest of the French 
populace and the resources of the Ministère de Marine. 
As a result, the Invasion force which sailed from Boche-
fort on August 6, 1798, comprised only 1,200 men. As in 
the previous càses, the French could not gain the support 
of the Irish revolutionaries. The force surrendered on 
September 8, less than three weeks after it had landed in 
2 Mary Hayden, A Short History of the Irish People, 
(New York, 1923), 233; 
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Ireland.3 
Nor did Napoleon himself have better fortune In 
Ireland. In 1804, while the emperor kmslly devised 
ways In which he might defeat his oountry's arch-enemy. 
Great Britain, the proposal was once again raised to 
Invade Ireland. As the year progressed, the planned 
Invasion "passed definitely from a demonstration to a 
resolve."^ The expedition, comprised of 18,000 men, 
met with little success. Like Napoleon's plan to ln= 
vade Britain, the Irish Invasion proposal came to naught 
whan the British gained command of the seas at the battle 
of Trafalger. 
Hitler was therefore well aware, not only of the 
obvious advantages to be gained by Invading Ireland, but 
of the far more numerous disadvantages that had been 
Illustrated by previous attempts. The Fuehrer, driven 
by desperation, chose to disregard those lessons ani as 
a result, came dangerously near to beginning an operation 
that could have only ended In abject failure. 
During the first months of the war, few German mil­
itary strategists gave thought to Ireland as a possible 
^ Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon the French Bevolutlon and Emplrel (Boston, 
1895), I, 347 and 379. 
4 Ibid. 11^ 124. 
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Invasion site. For the moment, France And Britain were 
the sole objects of German attention, the European contin­
ent and the Atlantic the only arenas of warfare.^ 
Much of the same attitude was taken in Eire itself 
during the first year of war. An invasion by Germany 
seemed in many quarters to be a vague, far distant threat, 
hidden, as it were, behind the Siegfried Line. For the 
moment, the main threat to Eire came from its ancient 
enemy Britain and what few defensive measures that were 
taken were aimed primarily at Britain. On May 23, 1940, 
Eduard Hempel wrote Eibbentrop that the Irish Army, 
together with the "nationalist population," were pre= 
pared to carry on "guerilla warfare against an English 
attack."^ As an after thought, Hempel advised the foreign 
minister that German intervention would most likely be 
greeted in a similar manner.^ 
Germany*8 Blitzkrieg through the Low Countries and 
France served to awaken the blissfully lethargic attitude 
of Dublin. Hempel reported on June 21, the day that France 
surrendered, that in a previous discussion with de Valera, 
^ Again, disregarding the significant part Ireland 
played in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
^ D.G.F.P.. IX, Doc. No. 310, 422. 
^ Ibid. 
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the Irish Prime Minister had oonfessed that "with Germany's 
closer approach anziety had increased . . . oonoerning poss­
ible German intervention to use Ireland as a bease for att= 
acks on England."8 ^he rapid succession of German victories 
during the first year of the war had convinced de Valera 
that it was futile for a small nation to attempt to repel 
the aggressive designs of a major power. If Britain attempt-
ed militarily to secure its western flank by invading Eire, 
the Prime Minister was convinced that Germany would send a 
force to halt such, a plan. Obversely, if Germany intended 
to use Eire as a base for attack against Great Britain, 
the British would most certainly move to obstruct such 
designs. In either case, Ireland would become a battle-
ground and join the long list of small states that had 
fallen prey to the machinations of larger states.9 
Throughout the summer of 19^0, the Irish government 
continued preparations for the attack, by either bellig­
erent, which had become increasingly Imminent. Believing 
that only internal strength could convince Eire's adver-
saries that invasion would prove too costly, de Valera 
had previously approved a 55,500,000 budget for the pur­
chase of capital equipment. With the money, the govern-
^ D.G.F.P.. IX, Doc. No. 506, 637. 
9 Ibid. 
124 
ment built airfields and an ammunition factory and 
created a small navy and air forceDe Valera's min-
ister of defense, Frank Aiken, also began the task of 
expanding the 37,000 man army (which included reservists). 
In addition to the expansion of the country's military 
potential, the various defense committees and agencies 
of Eire also took down all road signs, manned coastal 
defenses, maintained a strict surveillance of all German 
diplomats, and the amazingly effective secret police 
curtailed the efforts of German agents sent into Ire= 
land„^ ̂ 
The Irish were not alone in their fear of an invasion 
of Eire. In Britain, several supposedly Intelligent 
people fell prey to rather hysterical reports regard^ 
ing German désigna upon Ireland. One such report, investi-
gated by the Invasion Warning 8ub=Committee, stated that 
"German soldiers in civilian clothes are embarking at 
Naples for Spain, whence they will be sent from Cadiz for 
an attack qn Ireland, 
10 Time. XXXVI, June 10, 1940, 37-38. The Irish navy 
comprised six torpedo boats purchased from Britain. There 
are no statistics on the air forba* 
See Chapter III. 
12 ?eter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion, (New York, 1957), 
171=172. Hereafter cited as Fleming. 
125 
A far more realistic view was taken by General Sir 
E&mund Ironside, The former Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, in a report to the Chiefs of Staff on June 30, put 
forth his views on Operation Sea Lion, the impending 
German invasion of Britain, Sir Edmund pointed out that 
due to Britain's long coastline and Germany's possession 
of ports in France, Norway and the Low Countries an ln= 
vasion force could land at almost any point in Great 
Britain. "They may," stated Ironside, "even take Ireland 
first and so extend the possibility of landing still 
further west . . In addition, the main landings 
would be supported by parachute drops. Involving up to 
20,000 men, "anywhere in the United Kingdom or Ireland, 
Less than a week later, after Sir Edmund had further 
studied the matter, he estimated that the major German 
invasion forces would land at Kent and East Anglla, All 
other landings, Including In Ireland, would be diversion™ 
ary in nature, to force the British to divide their 
defensive forces, 
General Ironside's estimate of the situation proved 
to be the most aoourate. The military strategists in 
Gen, Sir Edmund Ironside, Diaries^ (London, 1962), 
June 30, 1940, 375» 
Ibid, 
Ibid. July 4, 1940, 380, 
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Berlin had indeed given Ireland a secondary role in 
their plans for Operation 8ea Lion, After the Invasion 
of Britain began, a small expedition of ships was to 
depart from Brest for the Invasion and, hopefully, the 
conquest of Ireland» The main Wehrmacht Invasion force 
would then be supported by *a large scale" parachute 
drop, sent to demoralize the Irish In the rear»^^ In 
consequence of the Invasion plans, a force of five or 
slz divisions not Included In the regular Invasion 
forces began amphibious training off the west coast of 
France.17 
In addition to the actual Invasion plans, Ireland 
was also Included In the German occupation plans. The 
Military Economic Staff, Wehrmlrtschaftsstab England, 
proposed that Great Britain be divided Into slz Military 
Economic Commands, based at London, Birmingham, Newcastle, 
1 8 
Liverpool, Glascow and Dublin. 
While Germany planned and Britain prepared, Eire 
continued with Its own defensive measures, still not sure 
William L. Shlrer, Berlin Diary, 
(New York, 1941), 553 V o 
17 Fleming, 262. Although the author gives a 
description of the training of the Invasion forces, he 
nonetheless believes the Invasion of Ireland to be 
merely a deception. 
18 Ibid. 
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where the Invasion would come from. On July 9» Prime 
Minister de Valera stated that if Eire were attacked, 
it was prepared to resist—-no matter what nation chose 
to Invade. De Valera at the same time onoe more sought 
to end partition and reclaim Eire's "Hibernia Irrendenta," 
Using the highly credible premise that Ireland could 
better defend itself whole and undivided, the Prime 
Minister Invited the north to join In defensive measures 
with the south. Unfortunately, he insisted that neutral­
ity be used as the basis for unification, a proposition 
the pro-British Protestants of Ulster could not allow. 
Three days later, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 
Lord Cralgavon, definitely rejected de Valera's offer. 
The question of a united defense against invasion was 
20 
thereafter closed. 
Measures to Increase Eire's military potential also 
increased as Invasion became more of a threat. Frank 
Aiken reported on July 15 that 120,000 men had volun­
teered for the army during the preceding six weeks, with 
25»000 joining in the previous week alone.By the 
The Times (London), July 9, 1940. 
on 
Ibid. July 12, 1940. 
Ibid, July 15, 1940. 
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autumn of 1940, the Irish army had expanded to well over 
200,000 men.22 Insofar as modern military statistics are 
oonoerned, these are not impressive figures, particularly 
when compared with the millions of men that both Germany 
and Britain commanded. However, Eire had two distinct 
advantages that the occupied minor states of Ebrope had 
not possessed. First, Ireland's geographical position 
made invasion by any major power, particularly Germany, 
an extremely questionable enterprise. Germany would 
find no mere borders or frontiers to cross in invading 
Ireland. Instead, an invasion force would be confronted, 
even with the acquisition of Atlantic ports, with a dan­
gerous voyage before reaching its target. Once there, 
long communications and supply lines would have to be 
established and maintained^—lines which would prove easy 
targets for the Eoyal Navy.^^ 
The second advantage held by Eire concerned the 
martial qulaities of the Irish themselves, which stepped 
far beyond simple ëlan. Ireland in 1940 was "presumably 
still supreme mistress of the art of guerilla warfare."^4 
Bound Table„ No. 121, December, 1940, 120. 
23 Clarence Brinton, The United States and Britain, 
(Cambridge, 1945), 117. Hereafter cited as Brinton. 
24 Ibid. 
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Nurtured during seven oentnrles of guerilla fighting, 
including the more recent "Anglo-Irish War" and the "Time 
of Troubles" in the 1920*8, the Irish were by far the 
most experienced guerilla fighters in Europe, Ireland, 
as a nation and as a people, had grown aoouatomed to 
living in more-or-less constant warfare, Germany would 
therefore be faced not only with the hard-core military, 
in the form of the Irish Army and the I.E.A. (estimated 
at numbering between 5,000=7,500 actlvisits and 15,000 
"fellow travelers"),but also with virtually an entire 
nation that presumably was ready to resume its old life 
under conditions of guerilla warfare. 
As each day passed during the autumn of 1940, the 
opportunity for a suooessful German invasion of Britain 
became more remote. The two key factors in such an 
invasion, command of the air and of the seas, could not 
be wrested from Britain. The superiority of the British 
Home Fleet had gained the melancholy recognition of the 
German strategists, Including Hitler, at the beginning 
of the war. However, the invasion oould still have 
become a reality of Hermann Gearing's Luftwaffe had 
gained control of the skies over Britain. By November, 
the Battle of Britain had begun to turn in the favor of 
Time, XXXVI, June 10, 1940. 
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the hard-pressed R.A.F. As a consequence, Operation 
Sea Lion met with frequent postponement. 
On November 14-, Hitler, who was less willing than many 
of his commanders to abandon the operation, ordered that 
Sea Lion be revived. "Each branch of the Armed Forces," 
he stated, "is to exert itself strenuously to improve its 
position."26 xn addition, the November 14 directive out­
lined the need to find alternative invasion plans if Oper­
ation Sea Lion should prove impracticable. 
Hitler believed that Germany might gain political 
or military advantages by invading Britain via the in­
direct route through Southern Ireland, The Naval Staff 
was therefore ordered to study the means by which such 
an attack could take place.̂ 7 
Military authorities in Britain had also reoognized 
the danger of an invasion through Ireland and had acted 
aoGordingly. The oommander In ohlef of the Home Fleet, 
Admiral Charles M. Forbes, had earlier agreed to transfer 
his main forces to a more advantageous position if a 
German invasion fleet appeared prepared to cross the 
North Sea. The Admiralty followed with a suggestion 
P.M. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy, (Cambridge, 
England, 1951), 110-111. 
Ibid. 
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that two battleships be based at Liverpool where they 
could easily Intercept any invasion forces en route to 
28 
Eire, In addition, a large British force been 
gathered in Northern Ireland, seemingly ready to cross 
the border "after the first shot had been fired at a 
German, 
On December 3» three weeks after Hitler had Issued 
his invasion directive. Admiral Erich Raeder presented 
the findings of the Naval Staff, His report to Hitler 
was plainly pessimistio. The Admiral noted that the 
greatest danger to Britain lay not in invasion, but 
rather in the destruction of its Industry and harbor 
installations by the Luftwaffe and the disruption of 
its overseas supply lines by Doenitz's submarine commando 
Furthermore, Raeder warned that Germany could ill afford 
the loss of prestige which would follow an unsuccessful 
Invasion attempt. Such an event "would tend to prolong 
the war and would, above all, create a strong impression 
in the U.S.A."3^ Finally, Raeder once more put forth 
what had become his favorite plan; Britain could be 
weakened by striking, with Germany's Italian ally, in 
29 Rosklll, I, 251. 
29 Time. XXXVII, January 20, 1941. 
30 UoSo Navy Department, Fuehrer Conference on 
Matters Dealing with the German Navy, December 3, 1940. 
Hereafter cited as F.C.G.N. 
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the Mediterranean theater of operations„ 
To support his arguments, Raeder brought forth a 
lengthy sutdy made by the Naval Staff, The primary 
necessity of any invasion of Ireland was naval suprem­
acy. This the German navy did not have, and it "could 
never be attained" due to the strength of the British 
Home FleetIn addition, the element of surprise„ 
which had been well employed in Nprway, ,wis"aid bë missing 
in any invasion of Eire, Because of Ireland's proximity 
to Britain, any invasion fleet sent by Germany would be 
quickly discovered by British patrols.33 
Ireland's geographical position would also compli­
cate invasion plans by forcing Germany to create long 
supply lines which would Instantly become easy prey for 
Britain's vastly superior navy. Raeder further stated 
that even the weather would make invasion an impossibil­
ity. Mindful perhaps of the Duke of Wellington,3^ Raeder 
pointed out that Ireland's prevalent weather conditions—" 
heavy rainfall* low clouds, and generally "very frequent" 
damp and foggy weather—made effective air operations an 
31 P.C.G.N.. December 3. 1940. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
3^ The Duke of Wellington once described Belgium as a 
"dreary, dismal place, somewhat like the better parts of 
Ireland." 
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Impossibility» Luftwaffe operations would be further 
restricted by the need of flying from bases In France 
through an area strongly contested by the 
Hitler had previously stated that "the occupation 
of Ireland might lead to the end of the war»"3^ The 
Fuehrer was therefore reluctant to abandon the Idea 
of Invading Eire, Agreeing that Invasion could not 
occur under the present conditions, he nonetheless con­
tinued to believe that success might be achieved if 
de Valera could be persuaded to seek German aid» As a 
result, even after Directive 21 (the invasion of Eusla) 
had been Issued on December 18,Hitler continued to 
regard the Invasion of Eire as a possibility. 
Throughout the first part of January,1941, the 
German radio oontlnuoùÈ^y warned thet-Irlsh that "Britain 
is to invade Eire through Ulster . . . in such a case, 
Berlin Is determined to react in the same manner as In 
the case of Norway and Belgium,"3^ The Irish government 
no doubt feared the possibility of a British attack. 
However, the prospect of being treated In the same manner 
35 F.C.G.N.. December 3, 1940. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Alan Clark, Barbarossa, (New York, 1965), 25. 
38 Time, January 29, 1941, 39. 
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as Norway and Belgium doubtless was looked upon as being 
hardly a desireable alternative. Consequently5 de Valera 
maintained Eire's neutral position, and no request for 
aid was made to Germany. 
Although preparations for Operation Barbarossa had 
already begun. Hitler sitll toyed with the idea of invading 
Ireland. On January 23, during a meeting with German 
air officials, Hitler brought forth the idea of invading 
Ireland by air. The German Fuehrer believed that by 
holding Eire he could "qulokly strangle Britain by cutting 
her Atlantic lifelines and destroying (its) terminal on 
the west ooast."^^ in conjunction with Hitler's air­
borne invasion plan, Hermann Goertz received several 
Abwehr messages instructing him to "report immediately 
about Irish defence forces. Order from the highest auth-
orlty."^0 is not known whether or not Goertz carried 
out his orders, for after the 1940-1941 winter the pro­
posal to invade Eire was completely abandoned. 
The opportunity for a German invasion of Eire was 
lost after the start of the eastern campaign» Although 
the threat of a British attack remained, by 1942 most 
Irishmen could rest assured that "so long as Hitler is 
39 Fleming, 296-297. 
40 Ibid. 181-183. 
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preoccupied in Eastern Europe, this Island will remain 
outside the war. 
Hltler'8 original views toward Ireland, either as 
a deception for Operation Sea Hon or the main focus 
of an invasion, were basically sound. The possession 
of Ireland might well have altered the outcome of Sea 
Lion, and hence the outcome of the war. However, the tact-
ioal possibilities for a suooessful invasion were praot-
ioally nil. 
In frustration Hitler began, after the feasibility 
of Operation 8ea Lion waned, to reaoh for the most im-
probable plans. Ireland had become, as one author points 
out, a part of the "complex Hitlerian extravaganza, 
Had Hitler decided to carry out his various invasion 
plans, he would have met with a fate similar to his 
Spanish and French predecessors-^abject failure* 
Round Table, No, 128, September, 1942, 496. 
Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, (Durham, 
N.C., i960), 231=232. 
CHAPTER V 
IN RETROSEEGT 
The wartime relations between two states, like all 
other aspects of aiplomacy, are normally judged by two 
well dèflned standards-^suooess or failure. However, It 
l8 a praotlaal Impossibility tb draw a oonoluslon as to 
whether Nazi Germany definitely suooeeded or failed In 
Its alms regarding Ireland. Because Germany ended the 
Seoond World War as the vanquished power, one can with 
some validity surmise that the loss of the war signifies 
a subsequent failure of policy. While many of the Third 
Belch's plans regarding Eire did Indeed fall, there was 
also a measure of success which cannot be overlooked. 
It therefore becomes the duty of the historian to balance 
the degrees of failure or^success to determine the final 
outcome of that policy. 
German diplomacy failed to create, or expand, pro-
German sympathies and support for the German war effort 
In Eire. The opportunities which existed In Ireland, 
particularly the partition Issue andtMw natural antag= 
onlsm toward Britain, were such that Irish support for 
the German cause could well have become a reality. How^ 
136 
ever, because of the effeat of outside influences; suoh 
as the United States and the Vatican; as well as the sensi­
bilities of the Irish themselves; the large majority of the 
population In Eire remained morally In support of the 
Allied oause throughout the war. 
Due to Hitler's Inability to provide adequate re-
sources, Admiral Doenltz's submarine command failed com­
pletely to exploit the neutrality of the Irish ports and 
their subsequent loss to the Allies, Had Doenltz been 
provided with the number of submarines he ocAslderAd. 
neoessary, the Battle of the Atlantic and henoec World 
War II, might well have ended differently. 
The efforts of the Abwehr must also be described as 
failures. With the possible ezoeptlon of Hermann Goert#, 
no German agent ever achieved the success that Berlin 
desired. No espionage network was ever suoceasfully created 
in Eire» No German direction was ever brought to the Irish 
Republican Army, In short, the history of German lntelli= 
gence In Eire is one marked chiefly ky f&llure and a re-
markable Ineptness, 
Finally, the proposed German invasion of Eire was 
also a failure. In addition to the obvious that the 
invasion never took place, one may also justifiably 
surmise that had invasion actually occurred, it too would 
have failed. The Irish most certainly would have resisted 
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a German invasion to the utmost of their ability and 
strength. The British would have blocked the occupation 
of a country so close to their homeland. The United 
States J with its large minority of Irish-Americans, 
might also have been moved to enter the fray much sooner 
then it actually did. Hitler's invasion of Ireland would 
have proven to be a disaster equalled only by the invasion 
of Russia. 
Such were the failures of German policy toward, and 
exploitation of, Eire. There was, however, one success 
which German policy achieved in Ireland—the maintenance 
of .Irish neutrality. Despite frequent crises „ German 
diplomats succeeded, with the aid of ineptness in London 
and Washington, in placating Dublin each time relations 
became strained to the breaking point. 
The benefits which Germany received from Eire's 
neutrality have already been cited, but a word might 
yet be said concerning the possible effects of active 
Irish participation in the war. Had Eire joined the 
Allied side in the conflict, the Irish ports would have 
been opened to the Allies and hence Germany's efforts 
to halt I^^Ltlsh shipping would have been seriously hamp-
ered. Eire could have furnished more than a quarter of 
a million men to the Allied armies, and additional sites 
for training and debarkation of Allied operations. The 
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United States would most certainly have sponsored the 
creation of Irish war industries which would have helped 
supply and equip Allied military forces. Finally, Great 
Britain would have been assured that no German invasion 
would come from the west, 
Nazi Germany would have received no such benefits 
had Eire joined the Axis powers in the war. Eire had no 
natural resources which could be used by Germany in the 
same manner that It used the resources of Bussia, the 
Balkans, and Norway. Irish manpower could not be safely 
transported to the Continent through waters and air largely 
controlled by Great Britain, In addition, an Ireland 
allied with the Third Belch would have become a prime 
target for an Anglo-American invasion and would, therefore, 
have required the protection of large German forces whloh 
Berlin could hardly afford, 
A neutral Eire was, therefore, of a far greater bene­
fit to Germany than any active Irish participation would 
have been, Germany succeeded in maintaining and exploiting 
that neutrality—a success that far outweighs its other 
failures. 
APPENDIX 
American naval vessels actually present in European 
waters at the cessation of hostilities in World War I » 
Queenstown 59 ships 
(2 tenders, 24 destroyers, 30 sub-chasers, 3 tugs) 
Berehaven 13 ships 
(3 battleships, 1 tender, 7 subs, 1 tug, 1 oiler) 
Brest 85 ships 
Cardiff 57 ships 
Gibralter 5-5 ships 
Genoa 2 ships 
Azores 12 ships 
Grand Fleet 5 ships 
Murmansk 1 ship 
Mine Force 13 ships 
Southampton 4 ships 
Plymouth 39 ships 
Corfu 37 ships 
Liverpool 1 ship 
total - 373 ships 
In addition to the naval forces stationed in Ireland, 
the United States also began, in 1917, the use of air craft 
In anti-submarine warfare. By the time of the armistice 
there were 26 naval air stations in Europe; l6 in France, 
5 in Ireland, 3 in England and 2 in Italy.* 
The preceding information was issued by the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, cited in Frothingham, 261-262 and 285. 
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